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Generation capacity expansion models [30] were initially designed for the monopoly electric-
ity industry. The problem was formulated as a minimization of the total annual investment
and operations cost of satisfying a given demand decomposed into different time segments.
Plant capacity costs are computed by first transforming overnight investment costs into an-
nual equivalents through a standard actualization formula.1 Total investment cost is then
the sum, over all plants, of their annual equivalent investment cost multiplied by their ca-
pacity. Operations costs are the sum of fuel costs consumed by capacities in the different
time segments of the year. The minimization of the total investment and operations ex-
penses determines these capacities. The so called “merit order” reflects the minimization
of operations costs for given capacities: plants are called by order of increasing operations
cost until the demand in the time segment is satisfied or curtailment of demand is found
necessary. Casting these different ideas within the linear programming capabilities of the
time was the significant innovation of these early models that would later be expanded in
several directions during the monopoly period of the power sector. Of direct relevance for
this paper is the extension of the static yearly model to a succession of periods where demand
and cost scenarios can evolve through time. Other extensions, not discussed here, improve
the representation of operations (e.g., reliability constraints and probability computation of
the operations costs). All those extensions took advantage of numerical progress by moving
from linear to non-linear, control and mixed integer programming; they also benefited from
the work in decomposition methods.
The extension of these models to encompass other sectors was a first significant change in
this evolution. TIMES developed since 2000 by the International Energy Agency’s “Energy
Technology System Analysis Programme” is probably the best known of these expanded
models today.2 This deals with several fuels in competition and hence could not be driven
by a single optimizing planner. This required a market interpretation that the restructur-
ing of the power and gas sectors also made compulsory. This shift had no computational
implications as it derived from fundamental economic principles: the primal-dual optimality
conditions of linear programs in activity analysis can be interpreted in terms of perfectly
competitive economies [10]; the dual variables of balance equations are interpreted as prices
and primal variables become actions of individual agents (producers and consumer) maxi-
mizing their profits (for companies) and welfare (for consumers) with respect to prices. This
1The economic life of generation plants are much longer than one year, requiring overnight investment
costs to be converted into equivalent annual costs (annuities).
2See http://iea-etsap.org for an introduction to TIMES and it’s predecessor MARKAL [16].
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economic interpretation justified, at least to some extent, the restructuring of the power
market: the minimization of operations cost under given capacities and its associated merit
order rule can be seen as resulting from a perfectly competitive market implemented through
an auction where producers and consumers respectively bid supply and demand curves. This
short-term market gives prices that generators will then use to expand capacities as in other
industries. To improve things further, financial products can help by providing hedging
instruments against the risk of departure from long-term forecasts.
Needless to say the perfectly competitive market is an ideal paradigm and market imper-
fections pervade reality. Indeed it isn’t hard to find an electricity market where consumer
prices have been increasing and investment has stalled except those that benefit from sub-
sidies [8]. A rational attitude is to seek some of the causes of the overall failure of the
restructuring in market imperfections and to cast them in computational form for assessing
them in realistic models. This is admittedly still an academic exercise but it is closer to
reality than assuming away the market imperfections that standard economic theory tells us
to be aware of. Divergences between real markets and the paradigm of perfect competition
can indeed be found in both the short and long-term restructured power markets.
This paper provides a unifying computational framework for mixing both perfect com-
petition and strategic behavior at least within a certain domain. For the short run market,
we consider the standard perfect competition and Cournot paradigms. For the long run,
we explore different implications of risk. Specifically we replace the standard deterministic
scenarios by an event tree of scenarios similar to the one used in stochastic programming or
finance theory. Given that event tree we successively consider situations where (i) one or sev-
eral risk neutral agents invest and consume, (ii) a single risk averse agent decides investment
and invest; we show that this situation can be interpreted as a decentralized market with
an extensive set of risk trading instruments and (iii) a set of risk averse individual agents
that invest, consume and trade risk to mitigate the impact of uncertainty. For reasons ex-
plained later in the survey of the literature we do not consider the case where agents exercise
market power in the investment stage (strategic withholding of investment) but we refer to
the computational literature that considers that problem. Mixing the two short run market
imperfections and the three long run market imperfections, we deal with six problems. As
we discuss, the computational framework allows for more, but this is left for further research.
1.2 Our approach
We treat these problems in a unifying conceptual and computational framework by formulat-
ing them as stochastic Nash equilibrium models. We give existence results for these different
models and illustrate the relevance of the analysis via a numerical example, the main results
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of which are summarized in Table 1, which shows each of the 6 cases corresponding to a
choice of risk neutral or risk averse agents, and competitive or Cournot spot markets, and,
for the risk averse cases, complete risk markets or no risk trading. As expected the greatest
welfare and the greatest investment in power generation capacity both occur in the case of
risk neutral perfectly competitive agents; these provide benchmark figures against which we
express relative welfare and relative capacity outcomes in all cases. As can be seen from the
Table, market imperfections may have dramatic effects on welfare and willingness to invest.
Market imperfections can thus be quite important and should be tackled explicitly at policy
level.
Relative Relative Problem
Risk-attitude Spot market Financial trading welfare investment type
Neutral Competitive - 100.0 100.0 optimization [a]
Neutral Cournot - 89.0 66.6 Nash game
Averse Competitive Complete 79.3 90.0 optimization [b]
Averse Competitive No risk trading 76.6 87.0 equilibrium
Averse Cournot Complete 70.6 60.3 Nash game [c]
Averse Cournot No risk trading 69.7 59.0 equilibrium
Table 1: Relative welfare (%), relative capacity installed (%) and problem type for the 6
different cases on an illustrative example
Note that the formulation of the investment problem in a risky environment leads in
general an equilibrium problem that cannot be conveniently reformulated as a convex opti-
mization problem. In Table 1, we highlight two situations when the problem is amenable to
simpler formulation. For example, it is well know that with risk neutral competitive agents,
the investment problem can be solved as a stochastic capacity expansion problem [a]. In
this paper, we show that complete financial trading allow a formulation to a special Nash
game [c], and that this Nash game can further be simplified to an optimization problem
when the market is competitive [b].
Section 1.3 coming after this introduction briefly places our work in the existing literature:
we present our models as extensions of former capacity expansion problems that we adapt
to the environment of competition and risk prevailing in the industry.
1.3 Literature survey
The literature on generation capacity expansion models is abundant. [50] offers an insightful
survey of cost minimization models and associated economic problems developed during the
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regulation period. [29] presents a general view of capacity expansion problems while issues
related to the transition from the regulated monopoly to competition are discussed in [23].
The TIMES model, which is used on a world basis (see reports available from the Energy
Technology Systems Analysis Programme), is a state of the art example of cost minimization
tools. [6] gives a comprehensive state of the art presentation of computational generation
and transmission capacity expansion models including those where investments are made
strategically, i.e., investment decisions account for their impact on the subsequence spot
market equilibrium. We take stock of that work to discuss aspects of the literature that
relate to the themes of the paper.
Uncertainty is today a key feature of the power market. Risk is not a market failure
but incomplete risk trading is (also referred as a missing market problem in the economic
literature [37]). Imperfect competition whether in the short or long run is also a market
failure. Market design is also prone to generate these failures but these are left for further
research. All of these distort investment. The extension of the basic cost optimization
capacity expansion model to a stochastic model seeking the expected minimal investment
and operations cost is the first and obvious step that comes to mind to get into these issues.
Chapter 3 of [6] gives an in depth treatment of stochastic generation capacity expansion
models from the viewpoint of a social planner.
As already mentioned the move from cost to market models relies on the interpretation of
the optimality conditions of the optimal dispatch in terms of a perfectly competitive short-
term electricity market. It may be paradoxical that Boiteux, who has always been a fierce
advocate of the monopoly in the power industry, was also the first author to have pointed
out that relation. The book of Schweppe and his co-authors [48] and the early papers of
Hogan ([21, 22] developed this relation between cost and markets into the methodological
background of the restructuring of the power industry. [3] summarizes these relations for
perfectly competitive generation and transmission markets. Our treatment of perfect com-
petition in the short-term market directly derives from these texts: it assumes a short-term
market cleared by a one stage, single settlement, in each hour.
One can immediately note that the primal-dual conditions of the stochastic capacity
expansion model can again be interpreted as describing a stochastic equilibrium in a perfectly
competitive market provided one assumes that all agents are risk neutral and share the same
probabilities of the different possible developments of the market; we mention that TIMES
includes this extension [28]. The investment criterion derived from the KKT conditions of
the stochastic version of the model retains the usual formulation of the investment criterion
provided one replaces the revenue and cost of the deterministic model by their expectations.
The short-term market clearing in every scenario is also perfectly competitive. This model
will be taken as the basis of our analysis of the literature.
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The economic literature was quick to contest the assumption of a perfectly competitive
short-term power market and to reveal the exercise of market power. Because our paper
deals with computational issues, we skip that literature except for mentioning [38] and more
specifically its first two sections that point to the special role played by the so-called Cournot
model in the analysis of market power (the bibliography of [38] provides a rich set of relevant
economic literature). The Cournot paradigm indeed quickly emerged as a convenient and
relevant alternative to perfect competition when there is evidence of imperfect competition.
It is not a perfect description of reality (in fact there is no empirically perfect representation of
market power) but a reasonable and easy to use approximation for exploring strategic issues
at a macro level. It is also related to industry concentration criteria used in competition law
and hence offers some welcome links to practice. Besides being conceptually convenient for
economists the Cournot model is also attractive for computation: it is based on the same
merit order rule as the optimal dispatch that underpins the perfect competition model, only
differing from the latter by the fixing of the price. [51, 31, 24, 20] typify treatment in the
computational literature. The Cournot model is our reference paradigm for modeling market
power in the short term.
Conjectural variations were introduced in 1924 in the economic literature as a general-
ization of the Cournot model. The notion has perhaps lost its appeal among economists
but [7] introduced a version of it computational oligopolistic models for enlarging the scope
of imperfect competition in the short-term market. This was largely followed in the com-
putational literature because it could be used as a (somewhat ad hoc) remedy to technical
difficulties encountered with sophisticated uses of the Cournot model as discussed next. For
the sake of conciseness we do not elaborate further on conjectured supply functions but
simply mention that they can be directly embedded in our computational framework.
Notwithstanding its attractiveness when applied to the sole energy market (as in this
paper), the Cournot model quickly becomes intractable (both computationally and in terms
of its economic interpretation) when extended to more complex situations that also encom-
pass services (such as energy and transmission or balancing). The economic difficulty is to
identify reasonable assumptions on how market power affects the different submarkets (e.g.,
competitive energy market and locally concentrated transmission markets or market power in
both energy and transmission or market power in energy only when transmission capacity is
ample). The computational challenge is to nest Cournot representations of submarkets (e.g.,
exercising market power on energy taking into account that it is also exercised on transmis-
sion). This leads to so-called Equilibrium Problem subject to Equilibrium Constraints [17].
EPEC problems are intractable and may have multiple solutions that need to be analyzed
to identify those that are economically undesirable (e.g., that show and excessive amount of
market power). [52] offers an in depth discussion of economic and (some) numerical aspects
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on a problem of energy and transmission. [46] is just one example of the many papers dealing
with EPEC through mixed integer reformulation; its interest is to focus on the analysis of
these multiple equilibria. [17] provides an extensive discussion of these questions and many
examples of EPEC models.
It appears difficult to bypass the difficulties raised by applying Cournot beyond the
single stage, single market model (which justifies resorting to conjectured supply functions):
referring again to [38], these authors propose to add a financial market before the physical
Cournot settlement to improve the realism of the model. This is indeed empirically justified
but it transforms the model into an EPEC with rather bad properties [34]. [38] also proposes
to replace the variable price minus cost margin of Cournot by a constant one that should in
principle be simpler and more robust in practice. The authors present their proposal for a
market with identical producers for which they obtain an explicit solution. The reader can
immediately verify that removing the assumption of identical producers leads to an EPEC!
Summing up, notwithstanding the difficulty of generalizing the Cournot model (let alone
more complex models such as supply function equilibrium models that are not discussed
here but are referred to in [38]) to multimarket, it remains a practical way to get a macro
assessment of the impact of market power. This is probably what is needed for looking at
investment.
One can close this discussion of spot markets by noting that short-term market imper-
fection can also be the direct (sometimes unavoidable) result of the market design. Except
for transmission and the debate on nodal vs. zonal systems, this topic has received much
less attention. Leaving aside subjects related to average cost pricing in the regulatory period
[19], or in transmission [51], one should mention the work on the two settlement market of
[32]. These authors note that the short-term market rarely takes the form of a single fuel cost
minimization as assumed here, and in most of the literature, but is implemented through of
a sequence of such problems (the two settlement model). They show that the two settlement
market can be reformulated as a complementarity problem. [26] also discusses that type of
model for linking successive market clearing without going through an EPEC. The reality is
that several short-term market imperfections can be formulated through single stage com-
plementarity problems that can directly be embedded in our computational framework. We
leave the issue for further research.
Strategic withholding of investment is a real possibility in restructured power markets.
Chapter 6 of [6] discusses that problem. Their model is a computational (and hence in
principle general) extension of a stylized model discussed analytically in [33]. Problems of this
type will always be EPECs: even the simplest representation of market power (the Cournot
model) will give that result as soon as embedded in a multistage (here long term market
followed by a short term market) problem. Besides the usual computational difficulties
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accruing from EPEC, [35] shows that these models can turn out to be extremely unstable,
with small changes of data leading to discontinuities of the behavior of the market. Based
on this experience we do not model market power at the investment level both because of
numerical and economic interpretation difficulties. The reader can consult [6, Chapter 6]
and references therein for experience with these models.
Strategic behavior can sometimes be difficult to differentiate from prudent conduct in
the face of risk [41]. The analysis of prudent conduct in the presence of risk requires moving
away from risk neutrality to risk averse for modeling the behavior of agents. Two cases can
be considered. One is to return to the optimization capacity expansion model and to replace
the expectation total cost of in the objective function by a risk function. The alternative is
to stick to the stochastic equilibrium model but to assume that each agent behaves according
to a risk function and no longer on the basis of expectation.
Risk optimization is a relatively recent, but already extensively developed, extension of
conventional stochastic programming. [49] gives a comprehensive presentation of both the
notions of risk functions and their use in optimization. In contrast with the risk neutral
market case, the interpretation of a risk averse market (where individual agents are risk
averse) model does not directly follow from an analysis of the KKT conditions of the risk
optimization model (a risk averse planner). The relation between risk-averse capacity ex-
pansion models was first discussed in [13] where the authors analyze the conditions for which
the KKT conditions of a risk-averse capacity expansion optimization model can effectively
be interpreted as a risk-averse equilibrium. These authors show that these conditions are
equivalent to the existence of a “complete financial market”. In related work, [41] gives a sim-
ilar analysis on hydro management. In the meantime a study of risk-averse agents who can
influence the “design” of their risky assets and hedge those assets in complete risk markets
was studied as a risky equilibrium model in [42], revised to include incomplete risk trading
in [43]. The recourse to more general utility functions is an alternative representation to the
construction of risk averse stochastic equilibrium model: [27] states such a problem through
the KKT conditions of the agent’s maximization problems. Similarly [47] states the problem
in Nash Equilibrium terms using an exponential utility function. Neither of these papers
discuss the relation between their model and a possible optimization problem. Risk aver-
sion in the presence of complete risk markets is our second assumption of long-term market
imperfection. Incomplete markets, that is when individual agents are modeled as behaving
according to a risk function, with and without financial instruments, are treated in [1].
Our models are stochastic Nash games. It is worth distinguishing these from a substantial
literature recently developed on monotone stochastic Nash games (e.g., [25, 44]). In the latter
each agent optimizes an objective function which is convex in its decision variable given the
decisions of the others, as in our models, under the assumption that the combination of the
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mappings derived from individual agents’ objectives is monotone in the Cartesian product
of agents’ actions. The incompleteness of risk trading, mentioned as the last long term
imperfection, violates this latter assumption.
1.4 Structure of paper
The building blocks of this paper are the classical risk neutral models of capacity expansion
for stochastic spot markets that are either competitive or Cournot together with recent work
on risky design equilibria [43] for agents whose risk aversion is characterized by coherent
risk measures [2]. The last topic is reviewed in section 2 and introduces a risk pricing agent
whose role is to set the probability measure that all other (risk trading) agents use to value
their risky assets; see Theorem 1.
Section 3 studies capacity expansion for stochastic and competitive spot markets. We
combine risk trading with capacity expansion for agents who are competitive in investment,
risk trading and production. The main goal of the section is to give an interpretation of a
risk averse social planner to the capacity equilibrium problem when the financial market is
complete. That is, the risky competitive capacity equilibrium problem with complete markets
(Definition 3) is equivalent to optimization under risk (Theorem 3). This is a direct extension
of the classical reformulation of a risk neutral competitive capacity equilibrium problem as a
risk neutral optimization problem (Theorem 2). We contrast the risk neutral, complete and
incomplete cases via numerical examples (cf. Table 1).
Section 4 is devoted to capacity expansion for Cournot spot markets, focussing on the
risky Cournot capacity equilibrium problem with complete markets (Definition 4) in which
agents invest in plant capacities and trade risk products prior to stochastic Cournot produc-
tion. We show in Theorem 4 that this equilibrium problem is equivalent to a pure strategy
Nash game in which the producers jointly participate in a classical risk neutral Nash Cournot
capacity game with a twist: the probability measure under which all generators evaluate
stochastic outcomes is endogenously chosen by the risk pricing agent. We also compare the
risk neutral, complete and incomplete cases via numerical examples.
The goal of section 5 is to show that in the case of competitive spot markets, the multi-
stage situation is effectively equivalent to the two stage case. The main interest, therefore,
may be in a realistic multistage numerical example that is presented in section 5.1.2. The
notation for translation from multistage back to two stages is given in section 5.2 and ap-
plied in Theorem 6 to give an optimization interpretation of the multistage risky competitive
capacity equilibrium problem with complete markets; this is multistage version of Theorem 3.
Section 6 provides sufficient conditions for existence of risky capacity equilibria with in-
complete markets in both cases of competitive and Cournot spot markets. See Theorems 8
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and 9. Section 7 concludes the paper and an Appendix appears after presenting the bibli-
ography to give a myriad of proof details that range from benign but tedious to structurally
interesting.
2 Risk trading and stochastic design equilibrium prob-
lems
2.1 Notation for uncertainty and coherent risk measures
Later we will see “design” variables x ∈ Rn that describe investments into risky assets such
as production plants whose future outputs and hence future profit — in fact we will model
uncertain cost as negative profit. Rn+ denotes the set of nonnegative vectors in Rn. The
Euclidean inner product will be denoted u⊺v for u, v ∈ Rn.
The space of uncertain outcomes (costs) is Z ∶= RK . That is, uncertainty or randomness
or stochasticity is characterized by a number, K, of stochastic scenarios indexed by ω ∈ Ω ∶={1, . . . ,K}. We may refer to a member Z of Z as (Zω) or (Zω)ω depending on the setting.
A probability density (probability measure) is a nonnegative vector Π ∈ RN whose entries
sum to 1. The set of probability measures is denoted P. In the risk neutral case we are given
Π ∈ P and evaluate the cost of any Z ∈ Z as an expectation or inner product,
EΠ[Z] ∶= Π[Z] ∶= ∑
ω
ΠωZω.
In many instances the stochastic phenomenon has a data source, for example a time series of
electricity prices. In that case the data is associated with an empirical probability measure
that we call the physical probability measure, also called the real world probability measure,
and denoted this by Θ.
For our purposes, coherent risk measures (CRMs) are defined as support functions over
sets of probability measures. That is, r is a CRM if and only if for some nonempty, closed
and convex set D of probability measures we have r(Z) = maxζ∈D ζ[Z]. The closed convex
set D associated with the CRM maxΠ∈D EΠ[⋅] is called its risk set. This definition of a CRM
is equivalent to saying r is real valued function on RK that satisfies a set of four axioms;
see [2] which initiated the axiomatic approach and the associated equivalence. Occasionally
we may refer to one of the axioms that a CRM r must satisfy without reference, so we
list them here: Axiom 1, convexity. Axiom 2, monotonicity: r(Z1) ≤ r(Z2) for Z1, Z2 ∈ Z
with Z1 ≤ Z2, where the inequality is taken scenario-wise. Axiom 3, translation invariance:
r(Z + α1) = r(Z) + α for Z ∈ Z and α ∈ R. Axiom 4, positive homogeneity: ρ(αZ) = αρ(Z)
for Z ∈ Z and α > 0.
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It may be convenient for modeling or computation to reformulate a CRM as a convex
minimization problem. When the risk set D is expressed using constraints such as nonlinear
inequalities, this can be accomplished by using standard convex duality. For later use we
specify a generic minimization description of a CRM,
min
u
g(u,Z) subject to G(u,Z) ∈ K (1)
where u is a finite dimensional vector, g is a smooth convex function, K is a closed convex
cone in a finite dimensional vector space and G is a smooth function that is convex with
respect to K.3
Looking ahead, we have an interest in a CRM r0 whose risk set is formed by intersecting
the risk sets of two (or more) other CRMs r1 and r2. Suppose r1 and r2 have the same
minimization representation up to parameterization, i.e., using the same functional forms g
and G that are parameterized as
g = g(⋅ ;γi), G = G(⋅ ;γi)
given scalar or vector parameters γ1 and γ2, and same cone K. In the examples to follow
it is clear that r0 may inherit the same representation where its parameter γ0 is calculated
as an elementary function of (γ1, γ2). That is, the minimization representation may also be
convenient for constructing parameterized families of CRMs.
Example 1. CV@R, [45]. The CV@R, which has several other names including expected
shortfall and several other, is a popular risk measure in stochastic optimization. Its risk set
is defined by DCV@R ∶= {Π is a probability measure∣Πω ≤ γ−1 Θω}
where Θ is physical probability measure. The convex minimization formulation of the CV@R
is given by the following Linear Program (LP):
rCV@R = min
t,U
{ t + γ−1EΘ[U] subject to U ∈ RK+ ,
U −Z + t ∈ RK+ }
Example 2. Good deal, [5]. The valuation of uncertain payoff is usually approached by two
methodologies: arbitrage pricing (based on replication arguments, eg. Black and Scholes
formula) and equilibrium theory (based on the exposure to fundamental sources of macroe-
conomic risk, eg. consumption-based CAPM). [4] introduced the good-deal pricing as a mix
of the two, where they impose a valuation that rules out arbitrage opportunities as well as
3This is equivalent to convexity of the real-valued function λ⊺G for each λ in K○ ∶= {λ ∶ λ⊺d ≤ 0, for all d ∈K}.
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assets with too high Sharpe ratio (because at equilibrium those “good-deals” would quickly
disappear as investors would immediately grab them). The risk set of the good deal risk
measure is given by
DGD ∶= {Π is a probability measure ∣ EΘ [(ΠωΘω )2] ≤ γ2} (2)
where Θ is the physical probability measure. In finance, this expression is also known as the
Hansen-Jagannathan bound. The calibration of this risk measure requires one parameter γ
linked to a targeted Sharpe ratio: γ2 = 1+SR2. A value of about 0.5 is usually representative
of the US market.
The convex minimization formulation of the good-deal from [11] requires to solve the
following Second Order Cone Program (SOCP).
rGD = min
s,t,U
{ t + γs subject to U ∈ RK+ ,
U −Z + t ∈ RK+ ,(√Θ U, s) ∈ LK+1} (3)
The symbol L is the Lorentz cone, defined as (x, y) ∈ LN+1 ∶= {(x, y) ∈ RN+1 ∶ y ≥ ∣∣x∣∣2}
Below we will be concerned with some risk sets that have interiority relative to P . For
each of the CV@R and good deal CRMs, the corresponding risk sets have interiority if and
only there is a probability measure that strictly satisfies the inequalities defining the risk set.
2.2 Review of stochastic design equilibria and risky design Nash
games
We review a noncooperative game of N agents. The first decision of agent i is a vector
of design variables xi that lies in a given decision or strategy set Xi ⊂ Rni . We writeI ∶= {1, . . . ,N},
xI = (xi)i∈I , x−i ∶= (xj)i/=j∈I ,
XI ∶= X1 × . . . ×XN , X−i ∶= ⨉
ıˆ∈I∖{i}Xi .
The design vector xi describes agent i’s investment (e.g., capacity) in a risky asset Ξi (e.g.,
a cost or negative profit stream from a production plant that operates in an uncertain
market), which is also affected by other agents’ decisions hence has the form Ξi(xi, x−i) ∶=(Ξiω(xi, x−i)) ∈ Z.
This noncooperative form allows to model various levels of competition in the mar-
ket, from competitive agents (i.e. price-taking agents) to strategic ones as in the Cournot
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paradigm. To that end we introduce some structure on the uncertain costs that fits our capac-
ity expansion situations: Each scenario cost Ξiω(xi, x−i) is the optimal value of a production
optimization problem carried out by agent i, e.g., it chooses its (second stage) production
quantity yi given that the plant capacity and operating cost is determined by both (first
stage parameters) xi and x−i. The generic version of this two stage optimization problem is
given in the next result which is entirely standard in parametric convex optimization. TX(x)
denotes the tangent cone to the set X at one of its members x.
Lemma 1. Let X be a closed convex subset of Rn, f ∶X×Rm → R be convex and continuous,
g ∶X ×Rm → R` be componentwise convex and continuous, and, for each x ∈X,
v(x) ∶= min
y
{f(x, y) subject to g(x, y) ≤ 0}
be achieved as a minimum. Then, as a function on X, v is convex and continuous. Moreover
if X is polyhedral and g is polyhedral then for any x ∈ X and d ∈ TX(x), there exists the
directional derivative v′(x;d).
In fact under much weaker conditions on X and g than polyhedrality we can show that v is
directionally differentiable at x ∈Xi in any direction d in the relative interior of TXi(xi).4 The
relevance is that this weaker directional differentiability opens the door to the application of
all of the ideas in this paper, from Theorem 1 (below) onwards, to recourse problems involving
nonlinear constraints. To keep the exposition focussed and simple we stick with polyhedral
feasible sets, i.e., linear constraints, at least with respect to constraints on investments.
As a shorthand, we say v is the optimal value function on X of a parametric fully convex
and linearly constrained program if the hypotheses of the lemma hold and g is also polyhe-
dral, where “fully” reflects convexity of the optimization objective and polyhedrality of the
constraints in (x, y) not just y. (An example of this situation is when both f and g are both
polyhedral hence the parametric optimization problem is equivalent to a linear program and
the optimal value function is polyhedral convex.) Below we will require Ξiω(⋅, x−i) to be
the optimal value function on a polyhedral convex set Xi of a parametric fully convex and
linearly constrained program.
In order to assesses the cost of an uncertain outcome, we endow each agent i with a
coherent risk measure ri ∶ Z → R, e.g., it values its uncertain cost Ξi(xi, x−i) as ri(Ξi(xi, x−i)).
This leads to another decision made by each agent i: What basket of financial products,
represented in a vector Wi ∈ W where W is a subspace of Z, it should it buy to hedge its
risk via ri(Ξi(xi, x−i)−Wi)? This question should account for the cost of financial products,
represented by the price of risk P r which is considered to be a vector dual to W, i.e., an
4Such conditions are related to the study of stability conditions in optimization such as calmness and
constraint qualifications.
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element in W∗ so that the cost of W is the Euclidean inner product P r[W ]. Agent i’s
optimization with respect to both design and hedging variables is
min
xi,Wi
P r[Wi] + ri(Ξi(xi, x−i) −Wi) subject to xi ∈Xi , Wi ∈W. (4)
The price of risk P r is determined by the equilibrium condition that all trades of financial
products balance each other:
N∑
i=1Wi = 0. (5)
Throughout the paper, we consider the three following situations:
1. the risk neutral (RN) case where all agents value their stochastic cost based on the
expectation under a given probability measure (the physical probability measure Θ);
2. the case with complete markets where agents are risk averse and all risks can be traded,
i.e., Wi is unconstrained in Z;
3. the case with incomplete markets where agents are risk averse and Wi can only vary
in a proper subspace W of Z.
The risk neutral case is the mostly studied in the literature and it is well known that, for risk
neutral agents, modeling risk trading (with endogenous price) is irrelevant to the equilibrium.
The reasoning is that risk trading can only have zero premium at an equilibrium, otherwise
all agents would take unbounded trading position. With such zero premium, all risk neutral
agents are indifferent to trade risk, i.e., the design decision xi is unchanged (see also the
discussion after Definition 1 to follow). This section formulates the generic problem, but
then mainly focuses on the case with complete markets. The incomplete case will be further
reviewed in section 6.1.
Our basic assumptions underlying risky design equilibrium problems are specified next.
For Π ∈ P we write Π ≻ 0 to denote Πω > 0 for all ω. Accordingly we write Π /≻ 0 to denote a
probability measure where Πω = 0 for at least for one ω.
Design Assumptions.
1. Xi is a nonempty polyhedral set in Rni for each i ∈ I.
2. Ξiω(⋅, x−i) is the optimal value function on Xi of a parametric fully convex and
linearly constrained program, for each ω and x−i ∈X−i.
CRM assumptions.
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1. Each ri ∶ Z → R is a CRM with a nonempty closed convex risk set Di, i.e.,
ri(Z) = maxΠ∈Di EΠ[Z] for each Z ∈ Z. Di ≻ 0 is called agent i’s risk set.
2. The system risk set D0 ∶= ∩iDi is nonempty. We call r0 ∶= σD0 the system CRM.
3. One of the two conditions below holds:
(a) Either, each risk set Di is polyhedral and convex.
(b) Or, D0 has nonempty interior relative to P.
4. D0 ≻ 0 by which we mean Π ≻ 0 for each Π ∈ D0.
In our later numerical examples we will use risk sets of the good deal type. This means
that the reader may have to keep in mind 3(b) in the CRM assumptions. For agents who all
use good deal risk sets, interiority of D0 relative to P is equivalent to having a probability
measure that strictly satisfies all the inequalities that are used to define agents’ risk sets,
see (2).
Definition 1 (Stochastic design equilibrium models).
1. The RN design equilibrium problem is the system where each agent i seeks a solution
xi of a risk neutral optimization problem,
min
xi
EΠ[Ξi(xi, x−i)] subject to xi ∈Xi . (6)
2. The risky design equilibrium problem with complete markets is the system that com-
bines (4) (for all i), where W = Z, and (5). To be explicit, a tuple (x∗I ,W ∗I , P r,∗) is a
solution of the risky design equilibrium problem if
(i) For all i ∈ I, (x∗i ,W ∗i ) is a solution of
min
xi,Wi
{P r,∗[Wi] + ri(Ξi(x∗i , x−i) −Wi) subject to xi ∈Xi} (7)
(ii) The financial market clears, i.e., (5) holds.
3. The risky design equilibrium problem with incomplete markets is the system that com-
bines (4), where W is a proper subspace of Z, and (5).
Observe that Definition 1 presents a hierarchy of equilibrium formulations from least
to most general. The RN design equilibrium model can be recovered from the risky design
problem with complete markets, given the probability measure Π, by taking each risk measure
ri ∶= EΠ because then stationarity with respect to Wi in (7) gives P r = Π and (7) collapses
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to (6). Of course (7) is a special case of (4), so that the complete case is generalized by the
incomplete formulation if we allow W = Z = RK in the latter.
Our main tool in analyzing risky design equilibrium problems with complete markets is to
reformulate them as a nearly-risk-neutral game, in Definition 2. (Analysis of the incomplete
case via an incomplete risk neutral game is presented in section 6.) The equivalence between
the equilibrium and game formulations is given in Theorem 1.
Definition 2 (Risky design game with complete markets). The risky design or Nash




i=1 Ξi(xi, x−i)] subject to Π ∈ D0. (8)
The problem (8) is attributed to a (system) risk pricing agent.
It is of interest that the game above is “stochastic endogenous” in that the probability
measure Π used by each design agent in its risk neutral optimization problem is determined,
at equilibrium, by the system risk agent. Note also that the system risk agent’s problem,
(8), is the evaluation of the system risk measure r0 = σD0 at the aggregate (or system) cost∑i Ξi(xi, x−i).
The following result was developed [43] in the slightly more general case discussed after
Lemma 1 above, which would allow for nonlinearity in the parametric fully convex optimiza-
tion problems underlying each component Ξω(xi, x−i).
Theorem 1 (Risky design equilibrium problem with complete markets as a game).
[43, Corollary 2]
If the Design Assumptions and parts 1–3 of the CRM Assumptions hold, then
1. The risky design equilibrium problem with complete markets and the risky Nash game
with complete markets are equivalent: (xI , P r) with some WI is a risky design equi-
librium with complete markets if and only if (xI ,Π = P r) solves the risky Nash game
with complete markets.
2. A risky design equilibrium with complete markets (xI ,WI , P r) is such that Π = P r




EΠ[Ξi(xi, x−i) −Wi] subject to Π ∈ Di.
The risky Nash game with complete markets is simpler than the corresponding equilib-
rium problem because it does not need risk trades WI ; the design variables xI form a solution
of a risk neutral Nash game, (6), rather than a risk averse game; and the probability measure
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used in (6) is optimized by the system risk agent rather than a price that is implicit in a
market clearing condition.
A final point is that the condition D0 ≻ 0 (part 4 of the CRM Assumptions) is convenient
when analyzing two- and multistage decision processes — see discussion after Definitions 3
and 4 in sections 3 and 4.1, respectively — but is inessential to Theorem 1 and to the paper
as a whole.
Remark 1 (Aside: The Risky design game with complete markets as a tatonnement heuris-
tic).
This simplification provides a useful decomposition that can be used by heuristic based on
proximal algorithms, surveyed in some generality in [40], where
- for all i, (6) is replaced by the following proximal operators
proxλ,i(vi) = arg minxi (EΠ[Ξi(xi, x−i) −Wi] + (1/2λ)∣∣xi − vi∣∣22 subject to xi ∈Xi) ,
- and (8) is replaced by
proxλ(p) = arg maxΠ (EΠ[ N∑i=1 Ξi(xi, x−i)] + (1/2λ)∣∣Π − p∣∣22 subject to Π ∈ D0) .
When, for a given Π, the (risk neutral) game with the N agents given by (6) can be solved
efficiently (e.g., when amenable to a single convex optimization problem), this heuristic can
be further simplified and potentially lead to faster resolution time.
3 Two stage stochastic competitive capacity equilibria
We study two stage equilibrium problems describing capacity planning for a single commod-
ity, here electricity, which is traded in a future, i.e., uncertain, competitive spot market. The
competitive assumption requires that all economic agents participating to the spot market
are price-takers, i.e., they don’t act strategically to influence prices. Along with risk aver-
sion in making capacity investments we introduce risk trading, i.e., a market for financial
products, and elaborate on the three situations described in the previous section, i.e., risk
neutral, complete and incomplete cases (see parts 1–3 of Definition 3).
For the risk neutral cases, hence without risk trading, it is well known that the competitive
equilibrium is equivalently represented by a risk neutral stochastic program; this classical
result is reprised Theorem 2 to follow. Computational frameworks that exploit this include
the stochastic TIMES model described in [28].
In the complete case, the equilibrium satisfies the standard axioms of perfect competition
and is called a risky competitive capacity equilibrium with complete markets. Our main result
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of this section, Theorem 3, shows that a risky competitive capacity equilibrium problem with
complete markets has an optimization interpretation in which a central planner solves a risk
averse stochastic program. In particular, it maximizes social welfare where the metric for
welfare accommodates all agents’ risk aversion attitudes. This reprises a key theme of [13].
The optimization interpretation is that an equilibrium can be determined by solving a convex
risk averse optimization problem, i.e., which is considerably more reliable and faster than
solving the equilibrium formulation. Beyond the clean and general statement here, which
can be applied to any perfectly competitive market, allowing for multiple goods, distributed
markets with congestion pricing, etc., our proof technique is also informative as seen in the
Appendix. It builds directly results from risk neutral welfare economics and design games
(section 2). This bypasses the need to translate equilibrium models into stationary conditions
as seen in prior papers.
The third case corresponds to the risky competitive capacity equilibrium with incomplete
markets and involves risk averse agents that can only partially trade risk trade, see Defini-
tion 3.3. There is no (known) reformulation of this case as a convenient optimization problem,
i.e., with complexity similar to that of the convex optimization problem confronting each
agent. Here we give some computational results but postpone existence theory to section 6.
3.1 Notation, assumptions and model review of competitive mar-
kets
Stage 0 consists of investment decisions in capacities of production plants that use different
technologies, and also in financial products (contracts for hedging risk). These investments
jointly anticipate an uncertain second stage which is a competitive (i.e. agents are price-
takers) spot market for electricity.
We model just two agents, one electricity generating company or genco, indexed by i = 1,
and one electricity retailer representing elastic demand, i = 2. All functions—including
investment cost, production cost, negative utility and risk measures— will be taken to be
convex and real valued (everywhere). As detailed next, we use ni to denote the dimension
of the investment variables, n the number of technologies or production plant types, and a
single commodity representing electricity.
Competitive Spot Market Assumptions
1. For i = 1,2 and ω ∈ Ω, Ii ∶ Rni → R and Cω ∶ Rn → R are convex cost functions for
investment and production, respectively, and Uω ∶ R→ R is a concave function for
utility of consumption.
2. For i = 1,2, Xi is a nonempty convex polyhedral set in Rni .
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3. (a) For i = 1,2 and all ω, we are given Aiω ∈ R`i×ni , B1ω ∈ R`1×n and B2ω ∈ R`2 ,
and biω ∈ R`i that define the second stage (recourse) constraints for Yω ∈ Rn and
Qω ∈ R, respectively,
A1ωx1 +B1ωYω + b1ω ≤ 0, (9)
A2ωx2 +B2ωQω + b2ω ≤ 0. (10)
(b) The second stage decision sets {Yω ∶ (9) holds} and {Qω ∶ (10) holds} are
nonempty5 for each xi ∈Xi and ω.
(c) There exists a competitive spot market equilibrium for each ω (see further
notation in section 3.1.2 to follow).
The simplest setting is linear investment costs, production costs and utility functions; X1 =
Rn+, X2 = R+; and recourse constraints 0 ≤ y ≤ x1 and 0 ≤ q ≤ x2 for all ω. The recourse
formulation (9) and (10) has the additional richness that the dimension of the investment
variable ni need not match the dimension of the recourse variable (n for generation or 1 for
retail), and the constraints may vary with ω. The assumption of existence in condition 3(c)
is inherent in the discussion6.
Also, in line with discussion after Lemma 1 in section 2.2, there is no fundamental reason
to restrict constraints to be of the linear programming type. The underlying theory, both for
risky design problems and for competitive (and likewise strategic) equilibria, allows for Xi
to be nonpolyhedral and the recourse constraints (9)–(10) to be nonlinear. To admit non-
linearity we would also have to include technical conditions to ensure the associated optimal
value functions (to follow in section 3.1.2) are sufficiently well behaved. For tractability of
presentation here, we will restrict ourselves to the straightforward polyhedral case.
The basic setting above, with only one producer, one retailer or aggregate consumer
and one commodity, is enough to establish the equilibrium template that combines physical
and financial investment as well as subsequent production decisions. In fact any number of
agents, any number of commodities and any number of stages can be accommodated. As
described in the previous literature survey, these kinds of equilibrium models have been used
to inform companies and policy makers, particularly in the energy industry, about long term
trends, i.e., how capacity will grow or shrink in tandem with changes in demand and prices.
5In stochastic programming, this property is known is known as relatively complete recourse.
6It is also far from stringent, e.g., follows immediately under either boundedness of feasible sets or a more
natural economic condition that marginal cost, at high enough levels of production, exceeds the marginal
utility, at corresponding levels of consumption.
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3.1.1 Stage 0: Real and financial investments
In stage 0 there are no physical assets for production or retailing. The genco, designated
as agent 1, will make a capital expenditure decision in each of n electricity production
technologies by selecting capacity x1 ∈ Rn+ of power plants in those technologies at a total
investment cost of I1(x1). Similarly the retailer, agent 2, will choose its service capacity as
the scalar x2 ≥ 0 at an investment cost of I2(x2).
This stage 0 investment translates to an uncertain outcome in stage 1, in fact a stochastic
cost of production or a stochastic utility of consumption, reflecting an uncertain commodity
market. The genco and retailer are risk averse; each puts a value on uncertain assets using
a coherent risk measure as we will explain later. They each choose investment levels to
minimize their costs, or equivalently to maximize their profits, though we will write each
investment problem as a minimization of cost net of revenue.
The genco and retail assess uncertain outcomes Z ∈ Z using coherent risk measures, r1(Z)
and r2(Z) respectively. Each ri is represented by a risk set which is a nonempty closed convex
set of probability measures Di such that ri(Z) = σDi(Z) as discussed in section 2. Also as
discussed there, agents engage in risk trading to manage their exposure to risk, e.g., if agent 1
has uncertain operational cost Z1 ∈ Z then it may hedge this by buying forward contracts,
represented by W1 ∈ Z, in order to change its exposure from r1(Z1) to r1(Z1 −W1). We
will elaborate on that after modeling the uncertain return of an investment xi, which comes
next.
3.1.2 Stage 1: Competitive equilibrium in each scenario of the spot market
Given n plant capacities bundled as x1, a spot market scenario ω (in Ω) and a price of power
Pω ≥ 0, the genco wants to operate as efficiently as possible. Its production decision is a
vector Yω ∈ Rn that is feasible with respect to capacity and has a production cost of Cω(Yω).
The amount of power offered by the genco to the spot market will be the inner product
e⊺Yω = ∑nj=1(Yω)j where e = (1, . . . ,1) ∈ Rn and (Yω)j is the jth component of Yω; and the
associated revenue is Pω e⊺Yω. Thus in spot scenario ω, the genco will maximize its operating
profit or minimize its net operating cost,
V1ω(x1, Pω) ∶= min
Yω
{Cω(Yω) − Pω e⊺Yω subject to (9)}. (11)
Similarly the retailer, given its service capacity which is a scalar x2, acts nonstrategically
in that it purchases a feasible quantity Qω of electricity at unit price Pω and sells it on to
consumers at the value of their utility Uω(Qω). In scenario ω the retailer’s minimum net
operating cost is
V2ω(x2, Pω) ∶= min
Qω
{PωQω −Uω(Qω) subject to (10)}. (12)
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Given scenario ω and capacity (x1, x2), we say that Pω clears the (spot or commodity)
market, or is an equilibrium (spot or commodity) price, if V1ω(x1, Pω) and V2ω(x2, Pω) are
achieved as minima by some Yω and Qω, respectively, and the market clearing complemen-
tarity condition holds,
0 ≤ e⊺Yω −Qω ⊥ Pω ≥ 0, (13)
where ⊥ indicates orthogonality, i.e., (e⊺Yω −Qω)Pω = 0. The equilibrium problem (11)–(13)
represents perfect competition in the spot market in that no firm is aware of the actions of
others or considers the effect of its quantity decision on the spot price. By a competitive spot
equilibrium, in scenario ω, we mean any (Yω,Qω, Pω) that solves (11)–(13).
A fundamental result of welfare economics says that the spot market in each scenario ω
is equivalent to a system optimization problem:
V0ω(x1, x2) ∶= min
Yω ,Qω
{Cω(Yω) −Uω(Qω) subject to (9), (10) and Qω ≤ e⊺Yω}. (14)
Indeed, the equilibrium spot price can be recovered as the dual or Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) multiplier, whose sign is chosen to be nonnegative, for the constraint Qω ≤ e⊺Yω.
We observe that Viω(xi, p) and V0(x1, x2) are examples of optimal value functions of
parametric fully convex and linearly constrained optimization problems, cf. Lemma 1 in
section 2.2, which sets us up to later apply the results on risky design games to the uncertain
cost of a competitive agent or the social planner.
Next we highlight some standard results from welfare economics that shows how these
value functions, and the spot price, are related at equilibrium.
Proposition 1. If the Competitive Spot Market Assumptions hold then, for any capacities(x1, x2) ∈X1 ×X2 and spot scenario ω ∈ Ω,
1. the (nonempty) set of spot market equilibrium quantities (Qω, Yω) corresponds to the
set of optimal solutions of the system optimization problem (14);
2. for any solution (Yω,Qω) of (14), the associated (nonempty) set of nonnegative KKT
multipliers Pω corresponding to the constraint Qω ≤ e⊺Yω is the set of equilibrium spot
prices; and
3. V0ω(x1, x2) = V1ω(x1, p) + V2ω(x2, Pω) for any equilibrium spot price Pω.
3.2 Stochastic competitive capacity equilibrium problems
The risk neutral equilibrium model posed as part 1 of the next definition is entirely standard.
It is presented here to set notation and foster comparison between the risk neutral and,
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nonstandard, risk averse equilibrium models with risk trading in parts 2 and 3, where the
closest precedents for the complete case include [13] and [9, 1] for partial risk trading. The
multistage version of Definition 3 will be presented in section 5.
Recall that Ω = {1, . . . ,K} and Z = RK . We will use vector notation to represent uncer-
tain outcomes over scenarios ω ∈ Ω,
Y ∶= (Yω)ω ∈ Rn×K , Q ∶= (Qω)ω ∈ RK , P ∶= (Pω)ω ∈ RK .
Definition 3 (Stochastic competitive capacity equilibrium models). Let the Com-
petitive Spot Market Assumptions hold.
1. Let Π be a probability measure. In the (two stage) RN competitive capacity equilibrium
problem we seek:
(a) an investment xi and a stochastic quantity Y or Q, corresponding to i = 1 or 2,
which solve the risk neutral capacity problem,
min
x1,Y
I1(x1) +EΠ[Cω(Yω) − Pω e⊺Yω] subject to x1 ∈X1, (9) for all ω,
min
x2,Q
I2(x2) +EΠ[PωQω −Uω(Qω)] subject to x2 ∈X2, (10) for all ω; (15)
(technically, we further impose that Yω, Qω solve (11), (12) for all ω to accom-
modate for the possibility that Π /≻ 0);
(b) a spot price Pω such that the spot market clears (13) respectively, for all ω.
2. Let ri ∶ Z → R (later, a CRM) for i = 1,2. In the (two stage) risky competitive capacity
equilibrium problem with complete markets we seek
(a) an investment xi, stochastic quantity Y or Q, and risk trade Wi that, for i = 1,2,
solve the risky capacity problem,
min
x1,Y,W1
I1(x1) + P r[W1] + r1(Cω(Yω) − Pω e⊺Yω −W1ω)
subject to x1 ∈X1, (9) for all ω,
min
x2,Q,W2
I2(x2) + P r[W2] + r2(PωQω −Uω(Qω) −W2ω)
subject to x2 ∈X2, (10) for all ω;
(16)
(as in the risk neutral case, we also impose that Yω, Qω solve (11), (12));
(b) a spot price Pω clearing the spot market (13) respectively, for all ω;
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(c) a price of risk P r that clears the risk market,
W1 +W2 = 0. (17)
3. The (two stage) risky competitive capacity equilibrium problem with incomplete mar-
kets has the same format (a)–(c) as the equilibrium problem with complete markets
while restricting risk trades to lie in a proper subspace W of Z, i.e., (16) becomes
min
x1,Y,W1
I1(x1) + P r[W1] + r1(Cω(Yω) − Pω e⊺Yω −W1ω)
subject to x1 ∈X1, (9) for all ω,W1 ∈W,
min
x2,Q,W2
I2(x2) + P r[W2] + r2(PωQω −Uω(Qω) −W2ω)
subject to x2 ∈X2, (10) for all ω,W2 ∈W.
(18)
We give some remarks to clarify the notation in the above definition. First, any parameter
that is not visible under a max or min is deemed by the optimizing agent to be fixed and
exogenous. In (15) for example, agent i takes the probability measure Π and the stochastic
commodity price P as given and does not anticipate that their decision xi has any impact on
those parameters or x−i. Second, the appearance of ω as a subscript indicates an associated
stochastic element indexed by ω ∈ Ω. For example r1(Cω(Yω)−Pω e⊺Yω −W1ω) is the value of
CRM r1 evaluated at the risky cost vector (Cω(Yω)−Pω e⊺Yω)ω−W1 ∈ Z. Third, in the sequel
we will assume that Π ≻ 0 or D0 ≻ 0 in the risk neutral or risk averse cases, respectively.
Then the scenario-wise equilibrium conditions that Yω, Qω solve (11), (12) follow from the
prior stochastic optimization conditions, hence do not need to be checked separately.
It is also worth noting that Definition 3 presents is hierarchy of equilibrium formulations
from least to most general. The RN competitive capacity equilibrium can be recovered from
the risky case, given the probability measure Π, by taking each risk measure ri ∶= EΠ because
then stationarity with respect to Wi in (16) gives P r = Π and (16) collapses to (15). The
complete case (16) is clearly related to the incomplete case (61) in that both formulations
would coincide if we allowed W = Z = RK in the latter.
3.3 Two stage RN competitive capacity equilibrium
A classical result of welfare economics interprets the RN competitive capacity equilibrium
problem as a central planning problem via two stage risk neutral optimization. The latter
system problem is to either minimize net cost, as in (19) below, or maximize welfare which is
the negative of net cost. We also give a corollary which formulates the system optimization
problem as a single stage stochastic program using the system spot value function (14); its
statement and proof, though well known, will be helpful templates for subsequent analysis
of the risky case.
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Theorem 2 (RN competitive capacity equilibrium problem as risk neutral op-
timization problem). If the Competitive Spot Market Assumptions hold and Π ≻ 0, then(x1, Y, x2,Q,P ) is an RN competitive capacity equilibrium if and only if (x1, Y, x2,Q) solves
the risk neutral system capacity problem
min
x1,Y,x2,Q
I1(x1) + I2(x2) +EΠ[Cω(Yω) −Uω(Qω)]
subject to x1 ∈X1, x2 ∈X2, (9), (10), Qω ≤ e⊺Yω for all ω, (19)
and P is the nonnegative KKT multiplier corresponding to the final constraint.
Corollary 1. In the setting of Theorem 2, (x1, x2) with some (Y,Q,P ) is an RN competitive
capacity equilibrium if and only if (x1, x2) solves
min
x1, x2
I1(x1) + I2(x2) +EΠ[V0ω(x1, x2)]
subject to x1 ∈X1, x2 ∈X2. (20)
Proof: Let (x1, Y, x2,Q,P ) be an RN competitive capacity equilibrium. Then (x1, Y, x2,Q)
solves (19), from Theorem 2. Also since Yω, Qω, Pω form a competitive equilibrium in spot
market scenario ω,
Cω(Yω) −Uω(Qω) = V1ω(x1, Pω) + V2ω(x1, Pω) = V0ω(x1, x2) (21)
where the second equality is from part 3 of Proposition 1. Thus (19) reduces to the problem
(20), indeed the latter must be solved by (x1, x2).
For the converse let (x1, x2) solve (20). Proposition 1 provides a spot market equilibrium
Yω, Qω, Pω for each ω, hence a feasible solution for (19). The objective values of these two
problems also match via (21). Since Π ≻ 0 then scenario-wise separability of (19) means
that all feasible points have scenario-wise equilibrium quantities Yω, Qω. This coincidence
of objective values and feasible sets gives optimality of (x1, Y, x2,Q) for (19).
3.3.1 Illustrative example of RN competitive capacity equilibrium
We present a small example with a producer that can invest in one technology. This plant
has a annualized capital expenditure of I = 90 C/kW and operating cost of C = 60 C/MWh.
The year is represented by a single segment with a duration of τ = 8760 hours. This producer
is risk neutral and solves
min
x,Y
Ix + τ EΘ[(C − Pω)Yω] subject to 0 ≤ Yω ≤ x. (22)




τ EΘ[PωQω −AωQω + B2 Q2ω] . (23)
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The quadratic term B of the utility is constant across scenarios and equal to 1 C/MWh2
while the linear term Aω is the only random parameter in this example. We consider five
scenarios (K = 5, Z = R5) in the second-stage with an equal physical probability of 20%, i.e.,
Θω = 0.2 for all ω. Its value in the different scenario is noted in Table 2.
ω scen 1 scen 2 scen 3 scen 4 scen5
A [C/MWh] 300 350 400 450 500
Table 2: The value of the linear term of utility function across scenarios
The risk neutral competitive equilibrium was solved as the equivalent system minimiza-
tion (or welfare maximization by taking the negative of the objective), cf., Corollary 1,
min
Q,x,Y
Ix + τEΘ [CYω −AωQω + B2 Q2ω] subject to Qω = Yω, 0 ≤ Yω ≤ x . (24)
The optimal investment is x = 389 MW. We report in Table 3 the value of the electricity
consumption and the price in each scenario, as well as their expectation.
scen 1 scen 2 scen 3 scen 4 scen 5 EΘ[ ]
Q [MWh] 240 290 340 389 389 329.6
P [C/MWh] 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.7 110.7 70.3
Investment margin [C/kW] -90 -90 -90 -84 354 0
Table 3: Risk neutral competitive equilibrium solution
When the utility is quadratic and the consumer is price-taker, the equilibrium solution
satisfies the usual linear relationship for price,
Pω = Aω −BωQω , (25)
also known as the linear demand function. The equilibrium production Yω of the producer
in the second stage is given by the following optimality condition:
0 ≤ Yω ⊥ µω +C − Pω ≥ 0 , (26)
where µ is the dual variable associated with the capacity constraint Yω ≤ x and has the
interpretation of a scarcity margin, i.e., a margin made the technology when it operates at
full capacity. Otherwise, given the optimality condition (26), the price equals to the cost of
the technology, as in scen 1, scen 2 and scen 3. In this table we also report the investment
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margin which stands for the net profit of investing one unit in the technology. It is computed
as (τ(Pω − C)Yω − Ix)/x. In the competitive case, this investment margin is solely due to
scarcity margin and can also be computed as µω−I. The producer of the plant is risk neutral
and the expected investment margin is 0 C/kW.
The total welfare is given by the expected profit of the producer and the expected surplus
of the consumer. The expected profit of the producer is the negative of the optimal value of
(22): it is equal to zero at equilibrium as the producer is price-taker and the technology has
a linear cost function. The expected surplus of the consumer is the negative of the optimal
value of (23). At equilibrium the consumer surplus for each scenario is given by
V2ω = τ (−(Aω −BQω)Qω +AωQω − B2 Q2ω) = τ B2 Q2ω . (27)
Its expected value is equal to 490.9 MC.
3.4 Reformulating the risky competitive capacity equilibrium prob-
lem with complete markets as system optimization under risk
Our first main result, Theorem 3 below, explains how to formulate the risky capacity equi-
librium problem with complete markets as optimization under risk. In other words, we show
that a risk averse centralized planning formulation of long term capacity risk averse invest-
ment, with risk trading, has an economic or market interpretation. The first version of this
result is due to [13] where it is derived for an electricity capacity equilibrium model with
inelastic demand and unserved or shed load that is priced at an exogenous value of lost load,
rather than elastic demand as we do here. A related formulation and result in the multistage
case is provided by [41] to analyze the impact of risk aversion on hydro power planning under
complete risk trading.
The proofs of related results in [13, 41] are via stationary conditions. We make a rather
different approach by viewing Theorem 3 as the fusion of two fundamental results. The first
is Theorem 1 (section 2) which characterizes risky design equilibria with complete markets
as a combination of a risk neutral Nash game with a risk pricing optimization problem.
The second is the classical result Theorem 2 or equivalently Corollary 1, which reformulates
an RN competitive capacity equilibrium problem as a risk neutral optimization problem.
These results allow us to work directly with equilibrium models instead of translating to and
manipulating stationary conditions. See section 8.1 in the Appendix for details.
Theorem 3 (Risky competitive capacity equilibrium problem with complete mar-
kets as risk averse optimization problem). If the CRM Assumptions and the Compet-
itive Spot Market Assumptions hold, then
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1. (x1, Y, x2,Q,P ) with some (W1,W2, P r) is a risky competitive capacity equilibrium with




I1(x1) + I2(x2) + r0(Cω(Yω) −Uω(Qω))
subject to x1 ∈X1, x2 ∈X2, (9), (10), Qω ≤ e⊺Yω for all ω; (28)
and P is the nonnegative KKT multiplier corresponding to the last constraint.
2. At a risky competitive capacity equilibrium with complete markets, Π = P r simultane-
ously solves the CRM evaluations
max
Π
EΠ[Cω(Yω) − Pω e⊺Yω −W1ω] subject to Π ∈ D1,
max
Π
EΠ[PωQω −Uω(Qω) −W2ω] subject to Π ∈ D2,
max
Π
EΠ[Cω(Yω) −Uω(Qω)] subject to Π ∈ D0.
Corollary 2. In the situation of Theorem 3, (x1, x2) with some (Y,Q,P,W1,W2, P r) is a
risky competitive capacity equilibrium with complete markets if and only if (x1, x2) solves the
risk averse system capacity problem
min
x1,x2
I1(x1) + I2(x2) + r0(V0ω(x1, x2))
subject to x1 ∈X1, x2 ∈X2. (29)
Remark 2 (on Theorem 3).
First, (28) and (29) are equivalent to maximizing welfare. Moreover these problems are
equivalent to linear programs when each Cω and Uω are piecewise linear and X1, X2 and D0
are polyhedral.
Second, the optimization formulations above suggests some simple sufficient conditions
for existence of equilibria. If design strategy sets Xi are bounded, e.g., if there is a budget
constraint on xi, then a solution exists because (28) has a continuous objective and its feasible
set would be nonempty and compact. Alternatively we note that coercivity, hence existence
of solutions, occurs under the Competitive Capacity Boundedness assumption which given
in section 6.2 and holds naturally as it is argued in the Appendix.
Finally, it is straightforward [43] to recover the equilibrium price of risk P r and risk trades
WI given the equilibrium quantities xI and spot price P : P r can be recovered, as noted in




while WI is any solution of
min
WI ∑i ri(Viω(xi, P ) −Wiω) subject to ∑i Wi = 0.
In fact P r is also the Lagrange multiplier for the last constraint.
3.4.1 Illustrative example of risky competitive capacity equilibrium with com-
plete markets
We now consider the case of risk-averse agents which operate as price takers in production
(second stage) and engage in complete trading of risk at the same time as making their
capacity decisions (first stage). The risk aversion of the consumer and the producer is
modeled by the good-deal risk measure calibrated on a same Sharpe ratio of 0.5 (i.e. γ =√
1 + 0.52). The producer can buy financial contracts at a market price of risk P r[W1] that
modifies its profit by +W1, where W1 can be chosen as any member of Z:
min
x,Y,W1
Ix + P r[W1] + rGD(τ(C − Pω)Yω −W1ω) subject to 0 ≤ Yω ≤ x (30)




P r[Wc] + rGD(τ(PωQω −AωQω + B2 Q2ω) −W2ω) (31)
The perfectly competitive equilibrium is obtained by combining (30) and (31) with the
clearing conditions on energy Qω = Yω and on the financial products W1 +W2 = 0. It can be
solved by the equivalent risk-averse optimization, cf. Corollary 2,
min
t,U,x,Y,Q
t + Ix + γ√EΘ[U2ω]
subject to Uω ≥ 0,
Uω −CYω −AωQω + B2 Q2ω + t ≥ 0
Qω = Yω
0 ≤ Yω ≤ x
(32)
The optimal investment is x = 349 MW. The electricity consumption, the price and the
system probability measure (the risk probability measure is the same for every agents when
risk markets are complete) is given in Table 4.
The electricity price makes the investment profitable in only two scenario (40% proba-
bility) but risk trading permits to efficiently hedge this risk. The expected margin of the
investment is positive and equal to 142 C/kW, but its risk-adjusted value (=(0.334+0.2757+
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scen 1 scen 2 scen 3 scen 4 scen 5 EΘ[ ]
Q [MWh] 240 290 340 349 349 313.5
P [C/MWh] 60.0 60.0 60.0 101.3 151.3 86.5
Investment margin [C/kW] -90 -90 -90 271 709 142
Π 0.334 0.2757 0.2066 0.1302 0.0536 0.2
Table 4: risky competitive capacity equilibrium solution with complete markets
0.2066) × −90 + 0.1302 × 271 + 0.0536 × 709 = 0) is equal to zero: the equilibrium value for a
risk-averse competitive producer.
The total welfare is equal to 388.3 MC and is the sum of the risk-adjusted profit of the
producer (objective value of (30)) and the risk-adjusted surplus of the consumer (objective
value of (31)). Again, the risk-adjusted profit of a price taking producer is equal to 0 as the
technology has a linear cost function.
3.5 Risky competitive capacity equilibrium with incomplete mar-
kets
We redevelop the previous example, from section 3.4.1, to give two cases of an incomplete
financial market. In the first setting, there are no financial products to hedge the investment.
This is equivalent to setting W = {0} though the model we use in computation omits risk
trading altogether. It is justified by observations that current financial markets do not
provide long-term hedging possibilities for capacities in that contracts become illiquid for a
maturity beyond four years [18]. In the second setting, agents can trade one kind of option
for hedging the outcome of the low demand scenario (W is a 1-dimensional subspace of Z).
The inability to trade all risks among agents is a market imperfection. The problem is not
amenable to a single optimization problem. Instead we reformulate the equilibrium problem
as a complementarity problem, via KKT conditions of its optimization subproblems, and
apply the PATH solver [15].
3.5.1 Illustrative example of risky competitive capacity equilibrium with in-
complete markets: No risk trading
In the first setting there exist no financial contracts. The total optimal investment of the
producer is x = 339 MW. The equilibrium solution is reported on Table 5.
When no risk trading is possible, there is no single risk measure or probability measure
that describes all agents’ behavior at equilibrium. In particular, the probability measure that
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scen 1 scen 2 scen 3 scen 4 scen 5 EΘ[ ]
Q [MWh] 240 290 339 339 339 309.4
P [C/MWh] 60 60 60.6 110.6 160.6 90.4
Investment margin [C/kW] -90 -90 -85 353 791 176
Π1 producer 0.2756 0.2756 0.2740 0.1497 0.0252 0.2
Π2 consumer 0.3712 0.2574 0.1238 0.1238 0.1238 0.2
Table 5: Equilibrium solution for the competitive equilibrium without any risk trading
is used by each agent to evaluate its CRM at equilibrium may be different, as can be seen
by the values of Π1 and Π2 in Table 5. The producer cannot fully hedge its investment and
requires a higher expected margin of 176 C/kW (note that its risk-adjusted value is again
0 C/kW). The welfare drops to 375.8 MC, which is equal to the risk-adjusted consumer
surplus.
3.5.2 Illustrative example of risky competitive capacity equilibrium with in-
complete markets: One financial option
We complement the previous case by allowing the two agents (the producer and the con-
sumer) to trade one financial option that partly hedge the uncertainty in demand. This
represents a market where demand is correlated to weather and there exists a financial
market for weather derivatives (e.g., heating or cooling degree days options traded on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange). The payoff of this option is
scen 1 scen 2 scen 3 scen 4 scen 5
Option pay off [C] 100 50 0 0 0
Table 6: The payoff of the option
At equilibrium the total capacity increases to x = 348 MW. The equilibrium solution is
given in Table 7. One sees the effect of the option on the risk probability measure of the
agents (closer on scen 1 and scen 2). This security efficiently hedges producer risk as he
invests to a value closed to the case with complete markets. Also the expected net margin
for investing reduces to 144 C/kW. The total welfare increases compare to the previous case
(no risk trading) to 387 MC.
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scen 1 scen 2 scen 3 scen 4 scen 5 EΘ[ ]
q [MWh] 240 290 340 348 348 313.2
P [C/MWh] 60 60 60 101.7 151.7 86.7
Investment margin [C/kW] -90 -90 -90 275 713 144
Π producers 0.3352 0.2713 0.2074 0.1358 0.0502 0.2
Π consumer 0.3176 0.3066 0.1986 0.0886 0.0886 0.2
Table 7: Solution for the competitive equilibrium with one financial option.
4 Two stage risky Cournot capacity equilibria with risk
trading
This section is the Cournot analog of competitive case developed in section 3. We consider
N −1 producers and a consumer. The producers engage in both capacity investment and risk
trading in the context of a stochastic Cournot spot market, i.e., producers optimally choose
their spot quantity to strategically influence prices. The consumer engages in risk trading:
its representation is simpler than in the competitive case (no investment in capacity) to make
sure that its reaction function in the spot market can easily be included in the producers
optimization (differentiable demand function). Modeling risk trading also on the consumer
side is economically relevant, he is the natural counterparty for risk sharing.
Cournot capacity equilibria are well studied in the deterministic and risk neutral cases,
see, for example, the references provided in [38] and a selection of computational Cournot
models represented by [51, 31, 24, 20]
We define the (two stage) stochastic Cournot capacity equilibrium problem in Defini-
tion 4, which covers three situations regarding risk: the risk neutral situation, the complete
risk trading and the incomplete risk trading. Our main result, Theorem 4, shows that the
risky Cournot capacity equilibrium problem with complete markets, in the sense of Defini-
tion 2.2, is equivalent to a risky Nash game with complete markets which combines the RN
Cournot capacity equilibrium of Definition 4.1 with a risk pricing problem, (44). This im-
mediately leads to sufficient conditions for existence of complete Cournot capacity equilibria
based on Nash’s classical work [36].
We illustrate the various Cournot capacity equilibrium models numerically, the risk neu-
tral, complete and incomplete cases. Existence theory for the last of these is developed in
section 6.
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4.1 Notation, assumptions and model review of Cournot spot
markets
Stage 0 consists of investment decisions in capacities of production plants that use different
technologies, and also in financial products in a risk market. These investments jointly
anticipate an uncertain second stage which is a Cournot spot market for electricity. On the
supply side we model the investment, in n generation technologies, and production decisions
of N − 1 electricity firms. For the sake of simplicity, demand is only represented by a single
consumer agent, the N th agent in the model, whose utility function leads to an elastic demand
curve, i.e., the market price of power is a known function of the quantity consumed such
that price decreases as quantity increases.
The basic template that we give below, involving convex operational and investment
decisions, can be directly extended to accommodate any number of commodities and any
convex constraints on production. We list our basic assumptions:
Cournot Convexity Assumptions For i ∈ I = {1, . . . ,N − 1} and ω ∈ Ω:
1. Ii ∶ Rn → R and Ciω ∶ Rn → R are convex cost functions for investment and
production, respectively.
2. The commodity price in the spot market scenario ω is a function pCω ∶ R+ → R+
that is directionally differentiable7 such that the revenue function q ↦ pCω(q + q0)q
is concave8 on R+ for any q0 ≥ 0.
3. For each ω, there is a Cournot spot market equilibrium.
To discuss producer i’s production decision, i ∈ I, fix its plant capacity xi ≥ 0. Its
production in any spot market scenario is constrained by capacity, 0 ≤ yi ≤ xi, and the
total power it offers to the market is e⊺yi. In spot scenario ω, the price of power will be
pCω(e⊺yi+q−i) where q−i denotes the residual supply, i.e., the total amount of power generated
by other agents,
q−i ∶= e⊺ ∑
ıˆ∈I∖{i} yıˆ.
Residual supply is known by each producer but taken as fixed, i.e., no generator anticipates
how its actions will influence others. We write the objective function9 faced by agent i as
Riω(yi, y−i) ∶= Ciω(yi) − pCω(e⊺yi + q−i)e⊺yi, (33)
7Directional differentiability at q = 0 means directionally differentiable in the direction dq = 1.
8Concavity of pCω is sufficient for concavity of revenue.
9This notation slightly abuses economic meaning by writing V Ciω as a function of y−i ∶= (yj)i/=i instead of
q−i, for simplicity.
32
to show that it acts strategically in choosing yi: it is aware of the effect of its quantity on
price. Its production decision is a solution Yiω = yi of
V Ciω(xi, y−i) ∶= miny {Riω(y, y−i) subject to y ∈ [0, xi]}. (34)
Given xI , (34) specifies a standard Cournot game in production quantities yI for the spot
scenario ω.
Observe that V Ciω(xi, y−i) is an example of an optimal value function of a parametric fully
convex and linearly constrained optimization problem. So later we can apply the results on
risky design games (section 2.2) to the uncertain cost of a Cournot producer.
To include risk trading from the demand as well as the supply side of the market, we
specify an electricity consumer. In a Cournot market, the consumer is a nonstrategic agent
who does not invest in capacity per se and is a quantity-taker. Its utility in spot market
scenario ω is
UCω (Qω) = ∫ Qω
0
pCω(q)dq .
In other words, the marginal value of consuming the “last” unit Qω is pCω(Qω). This demand
curve (reaction function) is included in each producer’s problem, such that the quantity
consumed match with the production YIω ∶= (Yiω)i∈I , i.e., Qω = e⊺∑i∈I Yiω. At the Cournot
equilibrium price pC(Qω), the consumer agent obtains a surplus given by
V CNω(YIω) ∶= pC(Qω)Qω −UCω (Qω). (35)
This value is entirely decided by producers’ actions YIω. In fact although not stated as such,
UCω (Qω) can be seen to be a degenerate kind of optimal value function of a parametric fully
convex and linearly constrained optimization problem, allowing the theory of risky design
games to be used with respect to the uncertain cost of the consumer.
4.2 Two stage stochastic Cournot capacity equilibrium problems
The risk neutral two stage Cournot game in part 1 of the next definition is entirely standard,
e.g., as embedded in [24]. The risk averse Cournot equilibrium models in part 2 and 3, which
involve risk trading, are nonstandard and the contributions here are new, building on risky
Nash games as reviewed in section 2.
Definition 4 (Stochastic Cournot capacity equilibrium models).
Let the Cournot Convexity Assumptions hold and Xi ∶= Rn+ for each i and ω.
1. Let Π be a probability measure. In the (two stage) RN Cournot capacity game we seek
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subject to xi ∈Xi, 0 ≤ Yiω ≤ xi for all ω, (36)
(for technical reasons10, we further impose that Yiω solves (34). Note also that the
spot price Pω and the consumer optimization V CNω are not explicitly written in the
formulation as they are embedded in functions of YIω.) ;
2. Let ri ∶ Z → R (later, a CRM) for i ∈ 1, ...,N . In the (two stage) risky Cournot capacity
equilibrium problem with complete markets we seek
(a) an investment xi, stochastic quantity Yi and risk trade Wi ∈ Z that, for each i ∈ I,
solve the risky capacity problem
min
xi,Yi,Wi
Ii(xi) + P r[Wi] + ri(Riω(Yiω, Y−iω) −Wiω)
subject to xi ∈Xi, 0 ≤ Yiω ≤ xi for all ω, (37)
(technically, the Yiω solves (34) for each ω)
(b) the consumer risk trade WN ∈ Z that solves the risky hedging problem
min
WN
P r[WN] + rN(V CNω(YIω) −WNω), (38)
(c) a price of risk P r that clears the risk market,
N∑
i=1Wi = 0. (39)
3. The (two stage) risky Cournot capacity equilibrium problem with incomplete markets
has the same format (a)–(c) as the complete case while restricting risk trades to lie in
a proper subspace W of Z, i.e., (37) becomes for each i ∈ I
min
xi,Yi,Wi
Ii(xi) + P r[Wi] + ri(Riω(Yiω, Y−iω) −Wiω)
subject to xi ∈Xi, 0 ≤ Yiω ≤ xi for all ω, Wi ∈W , (40)
and for the consumer agent (38) becomes
min
WN
P r[WN] + rN(V CNω(e⊺YIω) −WNω),
subject to WN ∈W (41)
10As for the competitive case, this accommodates for the possibility that Π /≻ 0.
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Note the hierarchy in the three Cournot capacity equilibrium models above: The risk
neutral case is a special case of the risky case, while the risky case is generalized by the
incomplete case in that if we could choose W to be Z, then (40) we would become (37).
In the sequel we will assume that Π ≻ 0 or D0 ≻ 0 in the risk neutral or risk averse
cases, respectively. Then stochastic optimization of production Yi in (36), (37) or (40) yields
optimality of Yiω for (34) in each scenario ω, i.e., condition (b) is superfluous in each of
the three equilibrium models above. This claim is obvious in the risk neutral case, due to
separability in Yiω, and will be shown later for the risky cases.
4.3 RN Cournot capacity equilibrium
RN Cournot capacity equilibrium problems are a well known type of pure strategy Nash
game, and standard game theoretic existence results [14] apply. We only transcribe the
specific result for linear demand function when the game can be solved by an optimization
problem.
Remark 3 (Cournot with Linear demand function).
For the specific linear demand function, i.e., pCω (q) = aCω − bCω q, the KKT system of the risk
neutral capacity equilibrium problem is integrable (cf. [14]). This property allows to derive
an associated convex optimization problem to solve equilibrium problem. This is well known
for the deterministic Cournot and transposes directly for the risk neutral case,
min
xI ,YI ,Q (∑i∈I Ii(xi) +EΠ [Ciω(Yi) + bCω2 (Y TiωYiω)]) −EΠ [aCωQω − bCω2 Q2ω]
subject to xi ∈Xi for all i,0 ≤ Yiω ≤ xi for all i and ω,
eTYIω = Qω for all ω. (42)
The objective function in problem (42) is purely technical and does not have any economical
interpretation. As we will show in the next section, this “trick” is only holds in the risk
neutral case (and for a linear demand function) but does not work when considering risk-
averse agents.
4.3.1 Illustrative example of RN Cournot capacity equilibrium
We analyze a symmetric RN Cournot game with two (∣I ∣ = 2) symmetric producers. Each
producer acts strategically on its production knowing its effect on the price, pCω(y) = Aω−By.
The first producer solves
min
x1,Y1
Ix1 + τEΘ[(C −Aω +B(Y1,ω + Y2,ω))Y1,ω] subject to 0 ≤ Y1,ω ≤ x1 ,
where I, C, A, B and Θ are given in Example 3.3.1. In particular, this Cournot example and
the prior perfect competition example are related by having the market price here equivalent
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to the marginal value of utility in the competitive case. The optimality condition for this
producer is given by
0 ≤ Y1,ω ⊥ µ1,ω +C −Aω +B(2Y1,ω + Y2,ω) ≥ 0 ,
where µ1,ω is the dual variable associated to the capacity constraints. In the case of symmetric
producers (Y1,ω = Y2,ω = Qω/2), this expression becomes
0 ≤ Y1,ω ⊥ µ1,ω +C −Aω + 3B2 Qω ≥ 0 .
This can be rewritten as 0 ≤ Y1,ω ⊥ µ1,ω +C − Pω + B2Qω ≥ 0. The term B2Qω represents the
strategic premium (in C/MWh) of the producer: she only produces when the price is higher
than its operating cost plus this value.
As we assume a linear demand function, the risk neutral duopoly equilibrium can be




Ix + τEΘ[CYω −AωQω + 3B4 Q2ω] , subject to Qω = Yω and 0 ≤ Yω ≤ x. (43)
The total optimal investment is x = 259 MW. The electricity consumption, the price and the
investment margin are reported in Table 8. We breakdown the investment margin in two
scen 1 scen 2 scen 3 scen 4 scen 5 EΘ[ ]
q [MWh] 160 193 226 259 259 219.6
P [C/MWh] 140 156.6 173.3 190.5 240.5 179.8
Investment margin [C/kW] 343 542 778 1052 1490 841
- strategic margin [C/kW] 433 632 869 1136 1136 841
- risk margin [C/kW] -90 -90 -90 -82 356 0
Table 8: Risk neutral duopoly equilibrium solution
part: the strategic margin and the risk margin. The strategic margin is due to the strategic
behavior of the duopoly and is equal to (B2Qω) × ( τQωx ) = τBQ2ω/(2x). The risk margin is
the other source of profit for an investment i.e. (Pω − B2Qω) × ( τQωx ) − I. The margin due to
risk is similar to the risk neutral competitive case (cf. Table 3), and its expectation is also
equal to zero as agents are risk neutral. The positive expected net margin of the producers
come only from their strategic behavior.
Compared to the competitive case, the welfare decreased to 436.1 MC. The symmetric
producers competing a´ la Cournot have a positive expected profit equal in total to 217.1
MC, while the expected surplus of the consumer drops to 219 MC.
36
4.4 Reformulating the risky Cournot capacity equilibrium prob-
lem with complete markets as a Cournot design game with
complete markets
The main result of this section, below, reformulates a Cournot risky capacity equilibrium
problem via Theorem 1, from section 2 on risky design equilibrium problems. This converts
the equilibrium problem into a risky Nash game with complete markets, comprising a RN
Cournot capacity game (36), which seeks an equilibrium (xI , YI) given a probability measure




i∈IRiω(Yiω, Y−iω) + V CNω(YIω)] subject to Π ∈ D0. (44)
This objective of the risk pricing agent in (44) is the sum of agents spot profit (or surplus)
and is the same expression as in the competitive case with complete markets, as
∑
i∈IRiω(Yiω, Y−iω) + V CNω(YIω)= ∑
i∈I (Ciω(Yi) − pCω(Qω)Yiω) + pC(Qω)Qω −UCω (Qω)= ∑
i∈I Ciω(Yiω) − UCω (Qω)
(45)
We call the combination of (36), (44) a risky Cournot design game with complete markets
and a solution, a risky Cournot design equilibrium with complete markets.
Theorem 4 (Risky Cournot capacity equilibrium with complete markets as a
game). If the CRM Assumptions and the Cournot Convexity Assumptions hold, then
1. (xI , YI , P r), with some (WI ,WN), forms a risky Cournot capacity equilibrium with
complete markets if and only if (xI , YI ,Π = P r) is a risky Cournot design equilibrium
with complete markets.
2. At a risky Cournot design equilibrium with complete markets, Π = P r simultaneously
solves the CRM evaluations for the system risk agent, (44), for producer agents i ∈ I,
max
Π
EΠ[Riω(Yiω, Y−iω) −Wiω] subject to Π ∈ Di.
and for the consumer agent N ,
max
Π
EΠ[V CNω(YIω) −WNω] subject to Π ∈ DN .
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Proof: Part 1. Suppose the tuple (xI , YI ,Π = P r) solves the risky Cournot design game
with complete markets, (36), (44). This is equivalent, from part 1 of Theorem 1, to existence
of WI such that (xI , YI ,WI ,WN ,Π = P r) solves conditions (a) and (c) of Definition 4.2. It
only remains to show that Yiω solves (34), which is condition (b) of Definition 4.2. This
holds by combining Πω > 0 with separability of (36) in Yiω.
Part 2 is given by part 2 of Theorem 1.
We end this section by giving sufficient conditions for existence of a risky Cournot capacity
equilibrium with incomplete markets.
Cournot Cost Growth Assumption
1. When xi ∈Xi, Ii(xi)→∞ as ∥xi∥→∞.
2. For each ω,
(a) when xi, yi ∈ Rn+ with yi ≤ xi, Ii(xi)+Ciω(yi)−pCω(0)e⊺yi →∞ as ∥(xi, yi)∥∞ →∞, and
(b) pCω(q) is decreasing in q ≥ 0.
The conditions in this assumption are economically innocuous. For instance part 2(a) has
some generality in that it applies to technologies with either high investment cost and low
operating cost or vice versa. In Europe, since 2010, the former category would include
renewable like solar and wind energy, and the latter would be more relevant to traditional
thermal generation.
The Cournot Cost Growth Assumption implies coercivity of (36), i.e., the objective func-
tion is unbounded if ∥(xi, Yi)∥ → ∞; indeed the lower level sets and hence optimal solution
set is nonempty, convex, closed and bounded uniformly with respect to any probability mea-
sure Π. This means that the proof of the next existence result is standard. Indeed if we
incorporate an appropriate bound on the feasible sets of (36), it is a corollary of Nash’s
classical result [36]; we omit tedious details.
Corollary 3. In the situation of Theorem 4, if either the Cournot Cost Growth Assumption
holds or each strategy set Xi is bounded, then there exists a risky Cournot capacity equilibrium
with complete markets.
Remark 4 (Risky Cournot capacity equilibrium with complete markets and a linear demand
function).
In the specific case of linear demand function, the Cournot equilibrium model with complete
markets is not amenable to a single optimization program. It can only be simplified to a
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Nash game with two agents: a risk neutral Cournot system agent solving the risk neutral
equilibrium problem in (42), and a system risk pricing agent solving
min
Π
EΠ [∑i∈I Ciω(Yiω) − aCω (Qω) + bCω2 (Qω)2]
subject to Π ∈ D0. (46)
This game is not amenable to a single optimization, as the KKT system is not integrable.
Compare to the competitive case, the objective of the risk neutral agent in (42) differs from
the welfare function in (46).
4.4.1 Illustrative example of risky capacity Cournot equilibrium with complete
markets
We elaborate on the risk neutral example, in section 4.3.1, by analyzing the Cournot equi-
librium problem with two symmetric risk averse producers who make capacity investments
and engage in complete risk trading, also with the consumer (the third agent in the setting).
In this setting, the two producers are acting strategically on the electricity market in the
second stage but they remain price takers on the financial market. The first producer solves
min
x1,Y1,W1
Ix1 + P r[W1] + rGD(τ(C −Aω +B(Y1,ω + Y2,ω))Y1,ω −W1ω)
subject to 0 ≤ Y1,ω ≤ x1 for all ω (47)
The problem of the second producer is symmetric (i.e. swapping index 1 and 2). The
consumer optimally hedges its spot surplus by solving
min
W3
P r[W3] + rGD( − τB2 (Y1,ω + Y2,ω)2 −W3ω) (48)
As shown in remark 4, the problem can at best be simplified to the following Nash game:
min
Q,x,Y
Ix + τEΠ[CYω −AωQω + 3B4 Q2ω] , subject to Qω = Yω and 0 ≤ Yω ≤ x.
max
Π
EΠ[CYω −AωQω + B2 Q2ω], subject to Π ∈ DGD(γ). (49)
We computed this duopoly example using the path solver (REF). The total optimal
investment of the producers is x1 + x2 = 234 MW. We report the solution of the complete-
duopoly case in Table 9.
The financial market is complete and hence the risk probability measure is the identical
for all agents (solution of the risk problem (44)). We report the expected net margin of
the investment and the contribution of the strategic premiums. When the producer is risk-
averse, the expected margin is not only coming from its strategic behavior but also from its
risk aversion. The total welfare is equal to 345.4 MC: the surplus of the duopoly is 172.7
MCand the one of the consumer is 172.7 MC.
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scen 1 scen 2 scen 3 scen 4 scen 5 EΘ[ ]
Q [MWh] 160 193 227 234 234 209.7
P [C/MWh] 140 156 173 216 266 190
Investment margin [C/kW] 388 604 867 1273 1711 969
- strategic margin [C/kW] 478 698 964 1025 1025 838
- risk margin [C/kW] -90 -94 -97 248 686 131
Π 0.3406 0.2748 0.1967 0.1266 0.0613 0.2
Table 9: Equilibrium solution for the Cournot case (duopoly) with complete markets
4.5 Risky Cournot capacity equilibrium problem with incomplete
markets
4.5.1 Illustrative example of Cournot equilibrium with incomplete markets
We elaborate the previous example, section 4.4.1, in the context of incomplete risk trading.
This problem is not amenable to an optimization problem and was solved using PATH.
No risk trading When the three agents (2 producers + 1 consumer) can not trade risk,
the total optimal investment of the producers drops to x1 + x2 = 230 MW. The equilibrium
solution is reported in Table 10.
scen 1 scen 2 scen 3 scen 4 scen 5 EΘ[ ]
Q [MWh] 160 193.3 226.6 230 230 208
P [C/MWh] 140 156.6 173.3 220 270 192
Investment margin [C/kW] 398 621 888 1312 1750 993.6
- strategic margin [C/kW] 488 712 978 1007 1007 838
- risk margin [C/kW] -90 -91 -90 305 743 155
Π1 = Π2 sym. producers 0.3228 0.2767 0.2217 0.1345 0.0443 0.2
Π3 consumer 0.3690 0.2609 0.1325 0.1188 0.1188 0.2
Table 10: Solution of the Cournot equilibrium without risk trading
There is no risk trading: the producers and the consumer value the different scenario
differently. The symmetric producers require a high expected margin for investing (993.6
C/kW): an important part is still due to their strategic behavior (838 C/kW) but the risk
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attitude plays a also a role. The welfare is equal to 341.7 MC, which is shared between the
strategic duopoly (172.7 MC) and the consumer (169 MC).
One financial option We analyze the effect of imperfect trading by allowing the producers
and the consumer to trade one financial option (cf., previous example). The total optimal
investment of the duopoly becomes x1 + x2 = 234.4 MW. The solution (Table 11) is close
scen 1 scen 2 scen 3 scen 4 scen 5 EΘ[ ]
Q [MWh] 160 193.3 226.6 234 234 209.6
P [C/MWh] 140 156.6 173.3 215.6 265.8 190.2
Investment margin [C/kW] 389 609 871 1273 1713 971.1
- strategic margin [C/kW] 479 700 962 1025 1025 838
- risk margin [C/kW] -90 -91 -91 248 688 133
Π1 = Π2 sym. producers 0.3413 0.2725 0.1969 0.1306 0.0587 0.2
Π3 consumer 0.3299 0.2953 0.1940 0.0904 0.0904 0.2
Table 11: Equilibrium solution of the Cournot case with one financial option
to the case where agents have access to a complete financial market (also in terms of net
margin for investment). The total welfare is equal 345 MC, where the strategic duopoly
risk-adjusted profit is 172.6 MCand the risk-adjusted surplus of the consumer is 172.4 MC.
4.5.2 Comparison of examples
We compare the different solutions in Table 12, where the cases are sorted by decreasing
welfare. This allow us to highlight the effects of risk-aversion, Cournot competition and
market incompleteness on the equilibrium.
In this simple setting, risk-aversion (calibrated on a Sharpe ratio of 0.5) has the biggest
impact on welfare. Risk-aversion is not an economic inefficiency but a description of the
utility function of the agents. Still its impact on investment is noticeable: comparing the
risk neutral case to no risk trading, the drop in capacity is ≈ 12%. Complete trading partially
alleviates this drop (by ≈ 2%); this relatively small welfare increase is due to the fact that the
uncertain parameter in our simple example induces a similar risk exposure for the consumer
and the producer, i.e., the high spot electricity prices occur in scenario where electricity has
also a high utility for the consumer, while low electricity price in scenario where the utility
is low. Hence, risk trading between the demand and the supply side cannot improve the
situation by much. The impact of risk trading may be more sensitive to changes in other
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Welfare Capacity Risk margin
Risk-attitude Spot market Financial market [MC] [MW] [C/kW]
Neutral Competitive - 490.9 389 0
Neutral Cournot - 436.1 259 0
Averse Competitive Complete 388.2 349 142
Averse Competitive 1 option 387.7 348 144
Averse Competitive No risk trading 375.8 339 176
Averse Cournot Complete 345.4 234.4 131
Averse Cournot 1 option 345.0 234 133
Averse Cournot No risk trading 341.7 230 155
Table 12: Welfare, capacity installed and risk margin
uncertainty parameters (e.g., the B parameter in the utility function or the technological
cost), as shown in [8].
The strategic duopoly retains investment the biggest but the associated drop in welfare
is less consequent : the loss of consumer surplus is compensated by the positive risk-adjusted
profit of the duopoly (equal to 217 MC in the risk neutral case and 172.7 MC for all risk
averse cases). Also in this case it appeared possible to restore the inefficiency of market
incompleteness by introducing one financial option that hedges the negative demand shocks.
Finally, Table 12 reports the investment margin due to risk, which we define as the expected
margin of the investment minus the expected strategic margin (for the duopoly cases). This
risk margin increases with market incompleteness, as the producer has difficulty in hedging
the uncertain payoff of its investment. Also this risk margin is lower in the duopoly cases,
the investment payoff being less risky due to strategic behavior.
5 Multistage risky competitive capacity equilibria
This section presents notation for risky design equilibria, and the specific situation of stochas-
tic capacity investment equilibrium problems, when the uncertain outcomes occur in multiple
stages and so do the investment decisions. The contribution of this section is in two parts.
One aspect, though important, is almost entirely notational: We show that the analysis of
the multistage case can be recovered directly from the two stage case. The case of multistage
risky design is given by Theorem 5 while Theorem 6 applies this to multistage risky com-
petitive capacity equilibria. The other contribution is a semi-realistic multistage numerical
example of capacity equilibrium staged over a seven year period involving 9 million variables
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and 24 million nonzero elements in the associated matrices; see section 5.1.2.
The nearest precedents to this section are [11] and [41]. Both analyze multistage com-
petitive situations in which risk aversion and risk trading are present at every stage. The
former takes a social planners view of capacity investment while the latter gives an economic
equilibrium interpretation to a social planner’s multistage water planning problem for hydro
power.
5.1 Multistage notation
5.1.1 Multistage notation relevant to expectations and CRMs
The phrase in the multistage setting refers to the following situation: Multistage uncertainty
is represented by a (finite cardinality) tree of nodes or vertices
ω ∈ Ω○ ∶= Ω ∪ {ω○},
i.e., a nonempty set of scenario nodes Ω augmented by a root scenario ω○ together with a
successor relation S(⋅) which is a set mapping from Ω○ to subsets of Ω including the empty
set, where S(ω) is the set of vertices that are immediate successors or children of node ω.11L denotes the set of leaves, i.e.,
L ∶= {ω ∈ Ω ∣S(ω) = ∅}.
Last, for any ω, define [ω] as the set of nodes on the predecessor path that starts at ω, moves
to its unique immediate predecessor (S)−1(ω)12 and continues recursively until it reaches ω○.
A multistage uncertain outcome or multistage risky cost is a vector Z = (Zω)ω∈Ω ∈ RK
where K is the cardinality of Ω. We also write L and Lc for the cardinalities of L and its
complement Lc ∶= Ω○ ∖L, so that Lc =K + 1 −L.
In addition we include a null stage quantity Zω○ ∶= 0 for the purpose of recursively
calculating expectations and risk measures. A multistage probability measure Π = (Πω)ω∈Ω
is a dual vector whose action on Z is recursive (or conditional) as defined by a multistage
expectation:
EΠ[Z] ∶= EΠ[Z,ω○]
where for each ω ∈ Ω○,
EΠ[Z,ω] ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Zω if ω is a leaf,
Zω + ∑
ω′∈S(ω) Πω′EΠ[Z,ω′] otherwise.
11We can relate this to stages by defining stage 0 to be the single node ω○ and stage j ≥ 1 to be the set
of successors of all nodes in stage j − 1.
12The tree structure of Ω○ gives uniqueness of immediate predecessors.
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By P we now mean the set of all multistage probability measures.
In Section 5.1.3 we will reformulate multistage probability measures as standard “single
stage probability measures” on the space of uncertain outcomes over the event set L, which is
our route to using results in prior sections. By contrast, a multistage probability measure Π is
not immediately recognizable as a probability measure on RK even though it corresponds to
a dual element ν ∈ RK+ , where νω is the product of Πω′ over ω′ ∈ [ω], because the components
of ν do not sum to 1 when there is more than one stage beyond the root node.13
We are interested in recursive formulations of multistage risk averse equilibrium problems,
hence the following type of risk measure as developed in [49, Section 6.7.3].
Definition 5 (Composite CRMs). In the multistage setting, a composite CRM r is a real
function on Z = RK if it has the following construction:
1. For each non-leaf node ω ∈ Ω, D(ω) is a nonempty closed convex set of (single stage)
probability measures on the event set S(ω).
2. r is recursively defined for ω ∈ Ω○ by r(Z) ∶= r(Z,ω○) where
r(Z,ω) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
Zω if ω is a leaf,
Zω + sup
Π∈D(ω) ∑ω′∈S(ω) Πω′ r(Z,ω′) otherwise. (50)
Note that a composite CRM is the support function of a nonempty closed convex set,D, of multistage probability measures Π such that, for each ω ∈ Lc, ΠS(ω) ∶= (Πω′ )ω′∈S(ω)
lies D(ω). In other words, the multistage or composite risk set D of a composite CRM is
the stagewise Cartesian product of (single stage) risk sets. Conversely, if D is a nonempty
closed convex set of multistage probability measures then its composite action described
above follows by by setting D(ω) ∶= {(ΠS(ω) ∶ Π ∈ D} for each ω ∈ Lc. A trivial example is
that a multistage probability measure Π gives a composite CRM r by defining D(ω) as the
singleton {ΠS(ω)} for each ω ∈ Ω○ ∖L, hence r = σD = EΠ.
Extending the minimization representation (1) of a CRM, it may be convenient to work
with composite CRMs that are computed by nested minimization. Similar to (50), we are
interested in the case when r(Z) can be computed as rˆ(Z,ω○) where rˆ(Z,ω) ∶= Zω for ω ∈ L
while for ω ∈ Lc,
rˆ(Z,ω)∶= min{ gω(uω, Zˆ(w))
subject to Zˆ(ω) = (rˆ(Z,ω′))
ω′∈S(ω), G(uω, Zˆ(ω)) ∈ Kω }
(51)
13E.g., in a binary tree, ∑ω∈Ω vω is the number of stages beyond the root node.
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where gω and Gω are smooth finite dimensional mappings and Kω is a finite dimensional
nonempty closed convex cone. This allows for a composite CRM to be constructed by
nested evaluation of standard CVaR or good deal CRMs.
Example 3. Multistage CV@R (cf., Example 1 in section 2.) Here the multistage risk set
defined at each stage ω by
DCV@R(ω) ∶= {Π(ω) is a probability measure∣Πω′ ≤ γ(ω)−1Θω′ for all ω′ ∈ S(ω)}.
The convex minimization formulation of the multistage CV@R is the following LP.
rˆCV@R(Z,ω) ∶= min
t(ω),U(ω){ t(ω) + γ(ω)−1EΘ(ω)[U(ω)]
subject to U(ω) ∈ R∣S(ω)∣+ ,
U(ω) − Zˆ(ω) + t(ω) ∈ R∣S(ω)∣+ ,
Zˆ(ω) = (rˆCV@R(Z,ω′))ω′∈S(ω) }
(52)
Example 4. The multistage good deal, [11] (cf., Example 2 in section 2) has a multistage
risk set defined at stage ω by





The convex minimization formulation of the multistage good-deal is the following SOCP (cf.,
(3) in section 2),
rˆGD(Z,ω) ∶= min
s(ω),t(ω),U(ω){ t(ω) + γ(ω)−1s(ω)
subject to U(ω) ∈ R∣S(ω)∣+ ,
U(ω) − Zˆ(ω) + t(ω) ∈ R∣S(ω)∣+ ,(√Θ(ω)U(ω), s(ω)) ∈ L∣S(ω)∣+1,
Zˆ(ω) = (rˆGD(Z,ω′))ω′∈S(ω) }
(53)
This problem has Lc second-order cone constraints.
5.1.2 Fishbone example - computational experiment
The models presented permit to analyze how risk affects the market equilibrium. They are
specially relevant for energy markets, as capacities are long-lived assets particularly vulner-
able to long-term risk. As long as they are amenable to convex optimization formulations
(e.g., linear program for a polyhedral risk measure like CV@R or SOCP for the good-deal),
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they can include all the relevant details of the market microstructure (as traditional capacity
expansion model).
We provide here a numerical example inspired by the situation of European countries.
The electricity demand faced a negative shock starting 2009 and has not yet recovered pre-
crisis level. Electricity producers facing such low demand and depreciated prices, reacted
by mothballing or decommissioning some of their plants (about 24 GW is mothballed and 7
GW is retired in Europe). As soon the economy (and the electricity demand) would recover,
the de-mothballing of those assets should also occur. The timing of those actions is therefore
affected by the risk of the macro-economic situation. We model this situation by constructing
the following “fishbone” tree where each year there is a probability of 50% of staying in
a central scenario fed with our best macroeconomic estimates (gradual rebalancing of the
electricity demand, fuel and CO2 prices,...), a probability of 25% to move to a more optimistic
situation and a probability of 25% to go to a more pessimistic situation (cf. Figure 1). This
scenario tree reduces the numerical complexity of the problem (and avoids the curse of
dimensionality) while retaining the dynamic effects of uncertainty in the backbone scenario.
Figure 1: The scenario tree
The experiment is designed to analyze how risk affects a competitive electricity market
and how trading opportunities mitigate the effects. We compute the two counterfactual
capacity equilibria that span the extremes of risk trading, namely with a complete financial
market (where every risk can be traded between agents) and with an incomplete market in
which there are no financial contracts. These are both cases of risky competitive capacity
equilibrium problems in Definition 3, section 3, albeit for a multistage rather than a two
stage setting.
To further simplify the experiment we assume that there are only two representative
agents acting on the electricity market: a price taking representative producer, owning and
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managing all the capacities and a representative consumer, with a linear utility function
U(Q) = V OLL×Q. This consumer only consumes nonnegative quantity Q below a reference
load. This consumer model leads to the common inelastic demand up to V OLL. The agents
risk aversion is modeled by the good-deal risk measure calibrated on the average Sharpe
ratio of S&P 500 index14. The reference load is described by a load duration curve with 144
time segment per year. At the beginning of the horizon, the producer owns about 210 assets
that can be actively managed (mothballing, early retirement, technological reconversion).
All those short-term decisions have a lead time of a year. The producer can also invest in
new assets (relevant for the second decade). To sum up, the models have roughly 9 million
variables. The complete market is solved numerically by the equivalent SOCP program
(about 24 million nonzero elements in the matrix).
The incomplete market is solved by an iterative scheme that is a kind of alternating
method. Each iteration first solves the risk neutral problem given the probability measure
Π of the producer, and then updates this probability measure based on the outcome of the
risk neutral problem. This alternating method uses the fact that the risk aversion of the
consumer does not impact the equilibrium (the consumer does not have time-dependent
decision) and there is only one price taking producer so that, given Π, one can compute the
equilibrium by solving the equivalent risk neutral optimization problem as a very large LP.
This computational heuristic converged well in our settings.
Figure 2 depicts the optimal asset management for the producer in the central scenario
(i.e., the backbone of the fishbone tree). It shows how complete risk trading between the
consumer and producer incentivize the producer to de-mothball its gas assets more quickly
than if he would not have the possibility to trade risk. This is consistent with accepted
economic theory [39] that a market satisfying all assumptions of perfect competition in a
deterministic world may become grossly inefficient in a risky environment if proper instru-
ments for trading risk do not exist. A final note is that what may seem a relatively small
difference, of 5C/MWh, in the baseload price between the complete and incomplete cases is
significant when considering the profit margin rather than revenue of any generating firm.
The inefficiency of the incomplete case is even appearing when analyzing the baseload
price in Figure 3. Even if it is higher than in the complete market case it still does not
incentivize well the producer to de-mothball its gas assets.
5.1.3 Transformation from multistage setting to single stage setting
To prepare for using results from previous sections, we translate of Z to a space of “single
stage uncertainties”, Z(L) ∶= RL, where L is the number of leaf nodes. Allowing for different
14This Sharpe ratio was equal to 0.53 at the time of computation
47
Figure 2: Mothballed capacity of gas assets [GW]
Figure 3: Baseload price [EUR/MWh]
notation, what follows and indeed further details can be found in [49, Section 6.7.3].
The translation of a multistage risky cost Z ∈ Z to a “single stage risky cost” ZL is via
sums over predecessor paths,
ZLω ∶= ∑
ω′∈[ω]Zω′ for ω ∈ L (54)
where Zω○ ∶= 0 as previously. The translation of a multistage probability measure Π, on Z,
to a probability measure ΠL, on Z(L), where we call the latter a single stage probability
measure, is via products over predecessor paths,
ΠLω ∶= ∏
ω′∈[ω] Πω′ for ω ∈ L
which relies on the auxiliary quantity Πω○ ∶= 1.
Two easy checks confirm that this translation is sensible: If Π is a multistage probability
measure then, first, the components of ΠL are nonnegative and sum to 1; and second, the
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multistage action (below left) is consistent with the single stage action (below right):
EΠ[Z] = ∑
ω∈LΠLωZLω .
We also need notation translating a multistage risk set D to its single stage counterpart,
DL ∶= {ΠL ∶ Π ∈ D}.
Here we give a summary of properties for multistage risk sets and CRMs that will need later,
details of which can be found in [49, Section 6.7.3].
Lemma 2. In the multistage setting:
1. If D is a closed convex set of multistage probability measures then DL is a closed convex
set of (single stage) probability measures.
2. If Di is a closed convex set of multistage probability measures for i ∈ I, then
(⋂
i∈IDi)L = ⋂i∈IDLi
3. r is a composite CRM on Z if and only if r is the support function of a multistage risk
set D that is closed, convex and nonempty. Indeed, such a composite CRM r = σD is
equivalent to CRM rL = σDL via the identity
σD(Z) = σDL(ZL) for all Z ∈ Z.
5.2 Multistage risky design problems
To define a multistage decision we need multistage variables which are vectors of stagewise
design variables, one for every non-leaf node. Recall the set of leaf nodes L, with cardinality
L, and its complement Lc in Ω○, with cardinality Lc. Formally, a multistage decision x is a
vector consisting of one subdecision, a subvector xω, for each non-leaf node:
x ∶= (xω)Lc ∶= (xω)ω∈Lc .
There is no loss of generality in assuming xω is an n-dimensional vector for each ω; this sim-
plicity is directly applicable in the setting of capacity decisions where the same technologies
are available at each node. That is,
x ∈ RnLc .
For instance in the two stage setting we have Lc = {ω○}, i.e., the only investment is xω○ at
stage 0 (as in prior sections).
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We will consider various agents i each with a multistage decision xi ∶= (xiω)Lc . Then the
multistage (complete) risk market has the same form as given in section 2: (4) (for all i) and
(5). Likewise, the multistage risky Nash equilibrium problem has the same general format
as previously: (6) (for all i) with (8).
To interpret the design problem faced by agent i as a multistage decision problem, its
risky cost mapping Ξi(xi, x−i) must respect the staged nature of the uncertainty, namely, it is
nonanticipative as described later. While nonanticipativity is needed for a practical or useful
formulation of an agent’s multistage optimization problem, neither that restriction nor the
lack of it affects the mathematical relationships between various equilibrium reformulations
explored in previous sections.
We now catalog the structural conditions required for the multistage design equilibrium
problems under risk aversion, where the Design Convexity and Design Technical Assumptions
are tacit.
Multistage assumptions. We are in the multistage setting with notation given in sec-
tion 5.1.1.
1. Each Xi is a set of vectors xi ∶= (xiω)ω∈Lc .
2. The CRM assumptions of section 2 hold with “composite CRM” and “multistage
risk set” replacing “CRM” and “risk set” throughout.
In light of Lemma 2, Theorem 1 from section 2 can be directly applied to multistage risky
design equilibrium problems as we do next in Theorem 5. In fact we don’t need Theorem 5
in the sequel. We provide it because it is a template for everything that follows, namely,
single stage results generally yield multistage counterparts without further work. See the
Appendix for a proof.
Theorem 5. Under the Design Convexity, Design Technical and Multistage (including
CRM) Assumptions:
1. The multistage risky design equilibrium problem and the multistage risky Nash game are
equivalent: (xI , P r) is a multistage risky design equilibrium if and only if, for Π = P r,(xI ,Π) solves the multistage risky Nash game.
2. An equilibrium exists for both the multistage risky design equilibrium problem and mul-
tistage risky Nash game.
To complete the formalities we describe nonanticipative optimization, namely, a problem
structure that respects the order in which information arrives during the decision making
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process. Since Ω0 is a tree, each (non-root) ω ∈ Ω has a unique immediate predecessor
ω′ = (S)−1(ω). Thus each node ω ∈ Ω has is a (unique and well defined) predecessor path
that begins at ω and runs back to the root ω○, which we denote by [ω]. A mapping Ξ from
x to Z that respects the stochastic tree structure must have the following form for each
component ω ∈ Ω:
Ξω(x) ∶= Ξω(xp(ω)) (55)
where
xp(ω) ∶= (xω′)ω′∈[ω]. (56)
This enforces nonanticipativity on Ξω(x) in that its value depends only on xω and other
decisions on its predecessor path.
In practice, we would apply Theorem 5 to risky design equilibrium problems for which
each agent optimizes a nonanticipative design problem.
5.3 Multistage risky competitive capacity equilibria with com-
plete markets
Here we extend the two stage competitive capacity setting with complete markets of sec-
tion 3.1.2 to multiple stages. Recall the two perfectly competitive agents, a genco and a
retailer of electricity, hence I = {1,2}. Given a multistage capacity decision xi ∶= (xiω)Lc ,
agent i’s investment cost is Ii(xi). (In simplest form, Ii(xi) ∶= ∑ω∈Lc Iiω(xiω).) In this
multistage setting, the capacity of any agent i at node ω is the sum of the prior investments
on its predecessor path:
ξ1ω = ∑
ω′∈[ω]∖ω x1ω′ , (57)
ξ2ω = ∑
ω′∈[ω]∖ω x2ω′ . (58)
A simple instance of multistage constraints on both investments and stochastic scenario
recourse decisions of the generator would be to combine (57) with recourse constraints such
as 0 ≤ Yiω ≤ ξiω for each ω ∈ Ω. Such multistage constraints are an example of (9) for suitable
A1ω, B1ω and b1ω. Thus the Competitive Spot Market Assumptions of section 3.1, though
posed in the two stage setting, remain appropriate to the multistage setting. A further
note is that while nonnegativity would be natural for physical capacity, via ξi ≥ 0, negative
components in xi could be allowed to model the retirement or mothballing of capacity at
any stage.
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At node ω ∈ Ω, given capacity ξ1ω and commodity price Pω, the generator solves the
recourse problem V1ω(ξ1ω, Pω) given by (11) but with ξ1ω replacing x0. Likewise at node ω, the
retailer, given capacity ξ2ω and commodity price Pω, has the recourse problem V2ω(ξ2ω, Pω)
defined by (12); and the social planner, given capacity (ξ1ω, ξ2ω), has the recourse problem
V0ω(ξ1ω, ξ2ω) given by (14).
The multistage version of the generator’s and retailer’s problems, (16), is
min
x1,Y,W1
I1(x1) + P r[W1] + r1(Cω(Yω) − Pω e⊺Yω −W1ω)
subject to x1 ∈X1, (9) and (57) hold for all ω,
min
x2,Q,W2
I2(x2) + P r[W2] + r2(PωQω −Uω(Qω) −W2ω)
subject to x2 ∈X2, (10) and (58) hold for all ω.
(59)
The “design variables” comprise (xi, ξi) and Xi could be any nonempty closed convex set in
RLct.The multistage stochastic equilibrium price P has the same specification as previously,
i.e., for each spot market scenario ω ∈ Ω, Pω must be an equilibrium spot price corresponding
to the quantities Yω, Qω. As before, the equilibrium condition on P r is implicit in the balance
of risk trades: ∑iWi = 0.
Moreover each composite CRM can be evaluated via nested minimization (51) rather
than nested maximization (50). This would put (59) in the form of a traditional multistage
stochastic program.
The next result is actually a corollary of Theorem 3, i.e., the equivalence between risky
competitive capacity equilibrium and risk averse optimization problems is valid in the mul-
tistage setting. A proof is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 6 (Multistage risky competitive capacity equilibrium with complete
markets as multistage risk averse optimization).
If the multistage CRM Assumptions with I ∶= {1,2} and the Competitive Spot Market As-
sumptions hold then (x1, ξ1, x2, ξ2), with some (W1,W2, P,P r), is a multistage complete com-




I1(x1) + I2(x2) + r0(Cω(Yω) −Uω(Qω))
subject to x1 ∈X1, x2 ∈X2, (9), (10), (57), (58) hold for all ω. (60)
6 Existence of risky capacity equilibria with incom-
plete markets
In this section we give sufficient conditions for existence of capacity planning equilibria with
incomplete markets for both competitive spot markets and Cournot spot markets (recall
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Definitions 3 and 4 in sections 3 and 4 respectively). We pose incompleteness by confining
risk trades to lie in a proper subspaceW of Z. This kind of incompleteness occurs naturally in
financial markets where the various classes of traded financial securities effectively provide a
basis of the vector space of all possible trades, W . In energy markets, members of W include
forward contracts on fuel prices for thermal generators, forward contracts on electricity
prices. However traded products typically aren’t available for very long term contracts [18]
and other important uncertainties such as regulatory shifts, e.g., the existence or level of
prices on CO2 emissions in North America, or prices of European emissions permits beyond
more than a year.
The literature on how risk aversion and financial market incompleteness impacts capacity
expansion markets is small. We highlight a very recent paper [1] which shows existence of
competitive capacity equilibria problems with incomplete markets via degree theory. We
give existence of such equilibria in Theorem 8. Our proof is considerably simpler that of [1]
because we draw on prior work on incomplete design markets [43]. This allows an immediate
and standard application of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem — which goes back to Nash’s
seminal approach [36] — to prove existence.
Subspace incompleteness, via W as above, is just one form of financial market incom-
pleteness. A relatively early paper [12] explores various equilibrium models for capacity
expansion accounting for different risk aversion characteristics of agents but no risk trading.
Liquidity limits, represented by a bound on elements of Z, is another possibility, see [9].
[8] combines subspace incompleteness with liquidity limits.
In section 6.1 we review risky design equilibria with incomplete markets based on [43,
Section 4] in order to introduce marginal risk equilibria, see Definition 6. Marginal risk
equilibria are important in reducing equilibrium models with incomplete risk trading to a
format that is amenable to application of classical existence results.
Section 6.2 tackles the competitive equilibrium problem by introducing its marginal form
in Definition 7 and using it to show existence of solutions in Theorem 8. For the Cournot case
see section 6.3 where the marginal form appears in Definition 8 and existence of solutions in
Theorem 9 as a consequence of Nash [36].
6.1 Review of risky design problems with incomplete markets
Here we present the findings of [43, Section 4] in which marginal risk equilibria are used to
characterize the incomplete version of risky design equilibria. This is an extension of the
review of risky design equilibria with complete markets and their relationship to complete
design games in section 2.
We are given stochastic processes Ξi(xi, x−i), representing uncertain cost, for each agent
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i ∈ I. We reprise (4): Agent i has a decision problem that combines design (xi ∈ Rn) and
incomplete hedging (Wi ∈W),
min
xi,Wi
P r[Wi] + ri(Ξi(xi, x−i) −Wi) subject to xi ∈Xi, Wi ∈W. (61)
Recall from Definition 1.3 that if xI ∈ RnN , WI ∈WN , P r ∈W∗ are such that each (xi,Wi)
solves (61) and WI is balanced, then (xI ,WI , P r) is an risky design equilibrium with incom-
plete markets.
The most extreme case of incompleteness is no risk trading, i.e., W = {0}, this reduces
to the RA design game,
min
xi
ri(Ξi(xi, x−i)) subject to xi ∈Xi. (62)
Existence of equilibria this risk averse case can be tackled by the wealth of existing results
starting with Nash’s seminal work [36] with further developments summarized in [14].
Next we introduce a risk neutral version of (61). We call it an incomplete risk neutral
(Nash) game; it extends the standard risk neutral game (6) by allowing each agent to have
a different probability measure Πi:
min
xi
EΠi[Ξi(xi, x−i)] subject to xi ∈Xi. (63)
What links (61) and (63) is the notion of marginal risk equilibrium, defined next.
Definition 6 (Marginal risky equilibrium). [43, Definition 7] Assume we are given
subspace W of Z and risky costs ZI ∈ ZN . We say ΠI is a marginal risk equilibrium for ZI
(relative to W) if there exist P r ∈ W∗ and a balanced list of trades WI ∈ WN such that for
all i,
Πi ∈ ∂ri(Zi −Wi)
P r = Πi∣W . (64)
The close relationship between (61) and (63) is shown next.
Theorem 7. [43, Theorem 11] Suppose the Design and CRM assumptions of section 2 hold,
and W is a subspace of Z. If D0 has nonempty interior relative to P then xI is, together
with some WI and P r, a risky design equilibrium with incomplete markets if and only if
1. xI solves the incomplete risk neutral design game (63); and
2. ΠI is a marginal risk equilibrium for ZI = (Ξi(xI))i∈I.
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The system given by statements 1 and 2 makes no mention of the list of equilibrium
risk trades WI ; these are implicit in the requirement that ΠI is a marginal risk equilibrium.
While this reformulation offers no advantage for computation, which still needs to specify
risk trades, it is helpful in deriving existence of equilibria via Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
We will use this result to reformulate the risk capacity equilibria with incomplete markets
in both the competitive and Cournot spot market cases, and give mild sufficient conditions
for existence of equilibria in each case.
We present two ancillary results from the proof of [43, Theorem 11]. The first explains
that the above interiority condition on the system risk set is sufficient for the incomplete
risk market to achieve equilibrium, indeed for boundedness of equilibrium risk trades. Al-
though we don’t make direct use of that result, it is implicit in everything that follows, e.g.,
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem relies on boundedness of the relevant set-valued mapping.
Proposition 2. [43, Theorem 11] Given an uncertain cost Zi ∈ Z and a CRM ri on Z for
each i ∈ I, if the system risk set D0 has nonempty interior relative to P then the set of
incomplete risk market equilibria is nonempty and compact.
The second result is for later use in establishing that the fixed point mappings used to
represent incomplete capacity equilibria are closed.
Lemma 3. [43, Theorem 11] In the situation of Theorem 7, the set mapping Φr which sends
ZI ∈ ZN to the set of all its marginal risk equilibria ΠI takes nonempty closed convex set
values, and has a closed graph: If ZνI → ZˆI in ZN and ΠνI is a marginal risk equilibrium for
ZνI , for each ν, then each limit point of the sequence {ΠνI} is a marginal risk equilibrium for
ZˆI.
6.2 Existence of risky capacity equilibria with incomplete markets
We recall the formulation of the risky competitive capacity equilibrium problem with incom-
plete markets from section 3.1. Given capacity x1 and x2 of the generator and retailer, in
spot scenario ω, the equilibrium quantities Yω and Qω are given by (11) and (12), and the cor-
responding equilibrium price Pω is set by (13). In the risky competitive capacity equilibrium
with incomplete markets (Definition 3.3), the agents determine (x1, Y1,W1) and (x2,Q2,W2)
by solving (18), which constrains Wi to lie in W ; P is a stochastic spot equilibrium price;
and P r clears the risk market, i.e., W1 +W2 = 0 as given in (17).
Recall further the capacity and quantity decisions of producers in the risk neutral case of





I1(x1) +EΠ1[Cω(Yω) − Pω e⊺Yω] subject to x1 ∈X1, (9) for all ω,
min
x2,Q
I2(x2) +EΠ2[PωQω −Uω(Qω)] subject to x2 ∈X2, (10) for all ω. (65)
This is identical to (15) other than that, here, each probability measure Πi may depend on
the agent. It appears in the marginal version of competitive capacity equilibrium problem:
Definition 7 (Marginal risky competitive capacity equilibrium problem).
In the (two stage) marginal competitive capacity equilibrium problem we seek
(a) an investment xi and stochastic quantity Y or Q that, for i = 1,2, solve (65).
(b) Yω, Qω, Pω that solve (11), (12), (13) respectively, for all ω; and
(c) (Π1,Π2) that is a marginal risk equilibrium for (Z1, Z2) when Z1 = (Cω(Yω)−Pω e⊺Yω)
and Z2 = (PωQω −Uω(Qω)).
In the situation of Theorem 7, it is immediate that the marginal risky competitive equilib-
rium problem is obtained from, indeed equivalent to, the risky competitive capacity equilib-
rium problem with incomplete markets. We state this formally in part 1 of the next theorem.
Part 2 is our main goal, giving existence of risky competitive equilibria with incomplete mar-
kets under the next sufficient condition. This is an alternative to [1] which shows existence of
equilibria in incomplete markets by applying degree theory to the stationary conditions that
characterize the equilibrium problem. Our proof, which appears in the Appendix, is direct
because posing the equilibrium problem in terms of marginal risk allows direct application
of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. This elementary approach dates back to Nash’s seminal
paper [36].
Competitive Cost Growth Assumption
1. When xi ∈Xi, Ii(xi)→∞ as ∥xi∥→∞.
2. For each ω, when x1 ∈X1 and Yω that is feasible for (9),
(a) I1(x1) +Cω(Yω) −U ′ω(0; 1)e⊺Yω →∞ as ∥(x1, Yω)∥∞ →∞, and
(b) ∥x1∥→∞ as ∥Yω∥∞ →∞.
3. For each ω, when x2 ∈X2, ω ∈ Ω and Qω is feasible for (10),
(a) I2(x2) −Uω(Qω)→∞ as ∥(xi,Qω)∥∞ →∞, and
(b) ∥x2∥→∞ as ∥Qω∥∞ →∞.
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Similar to the Cournot Cost Growth Assumptions from section 4.4, this assumption reflects
the practicalities of capacity markets. For example, part 2(a) says that combined capacity
and production cost will, at high quantities, outstrip the revenue of production even at the
highest price;15 and 2(b), that increasing production implies increasing capacity.
Theorem 8. If the CRM and Competitive Spot Market Assumptions hold, W is a proper
subspace of Z, and D0 has nonempty interior relative to P, then
1. (x1, Y, x2,Q) and P , together with some (W1,W2) and P r, form a risky competitive
capacity equilibrium with incomplete markets if and only if (x1, Y, x2,Q) and P , together
with some (Π1,Π2), solve the marginal form in Definition 7 above; and
2. there exists a risky competitive capacity equilibrium with incomplete markets if either
the Competitive Cost Growth Assumption holds or the feasible sets of (65) are bounded.
See section 3.5 for a numerical example that illustrates two incomplete cases of compet-
itive capacity equilibrium models: no risk trading (W = {0}) and trading of a single kind of
contract (W has dimension 1).
6.3 Existence of risky Cournot capacity equilibria with incomplete
markets
We recall the setting of stochastic Cournot capacity equilibria from section 4.2, in which
there are N − 1 producers indexed by i ∈ I = {1, . . . ,N − 1}, and an Nth agent representing
consumer demand. Consider the Cournot spot market in scenario ω. Producer i, with
plant capacity xi, optimizes production by choosing yi = Yiω to solve (34). Given producers’
decisions YIω = (Yiω)i∈I , the consumer sets a price by looking at the total output and obtains
a surplus V CNω(YIω) as in (35).
Recall further the capacity and quantity decisions of producers in the risk neutral Cournot
capacity problem, (36). The incomplete version is similar but with a possibly different




subject to xi ∈Xi, 0 ≤ Yiω ≤ xi for all ω , (66)
Definition 8 (Marginal risky Cournot capacity equilibrium problem). In the (two
stage) marginal Cournot capacity equilibrium problem we seek (a) an investment xi and
stochastic quantity Yi that, for each i ∈ I, solve (66) such that (b) the quantity Yiω solves
(34) for each i ∈ I and ω; and (c) (ΠI ,ΠN) is a marginal risk equilibrium for (ZI , ZN) when
Zi = Riω(Yiω, Y−iω) for i ∈ I and ZN = (V CN,ω(YIω)).
15U ′ω(0; 1) ≥ U ′ω(q; 1) for all q ≥ 0 by concavity of Uω.
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Part 1 of the next result is a direct application of Theorem 7; no proof is needed. Part 2
uses the Cournot Cost Growth Condition from section 4.4, and, like Corollary 3 from that
section, is a direct application of Nash’s existence theorem [36], hence we omit the proof
details.
Theorem 9. If the Cournot Convexity Assumptions hold, W is a proper subspace of Z, andD0 has nonempty interior relative to P, then
1. (xI , YI), with some (WI ,WN) and P r, forms a risky Cournot capacity equilibrium with
incomplete markets if and only if (xI , YI), with some (ΠI ,ΠN), solves the marginal
risky Cournot capacity equilibrium problem; and
2. there exists an risky Cournot capacity equilibrium with incomplete markets if, in ad-
dition, either the Cournot Cost Growth Assumption holds or the strategy sets Xi are
bounded.
See section 4.5.1 for a numerical example that illustrates two incomplete cases of com-
petitive capacity equilibrium models: no risk trading (W = {0}) and trading of a single kind
of contract (W has dimension 1).
7 Conclusions
This paper extends capacity expansions problem initially formulated as cost optimization
problem during the regulatory period to stochastic equilibrium models aimed at representing
markets with an emphasis on imperfections commonly occurring in the energy markets. The
objective is to provide a unified computational context sufficiently general to treat different
market imperfections that we can be traced to observations (for instance of the market
design) or recognized economic market failures (excessive concentration or incomplete risk
markets). We separate long and short-term market imperfections so as to progressively
construct a catalogue of each (this paper is a first step) that we can combine to assess a
wide range of possibilities. Our unifying theory is based on a single formulation of these
problems as Nash equilibrium, where the descriptions of the short and long-term markets
can be adapted provided they remain in complementarity form. Some of these models reduce
to optimization problems but not all. When not, the models also raise non-monotonicity
that will need to be explored in the future. In contrast with other work we never get into
MPEC and EPEC models because of the numerical issues that they raise and the difficulty of
finding an easy economic interpretation of these results. The analysis (existence theorems)
is fully explored for a static model and extended to the dynamic set up on the basis of an
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appropriate change of notation and the restriction of multi-period risk function to guarantee
their time consistency.
Numerical results on examples, including the multi-period case, reveal that market im-
perfections are of definite practical relevance. Investments in the power sector (which are
currently stalled except for subsidized capacities) can drastically differ depending on short
and long-term market imperfections.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Theorem 3
As mentioned above, the proof to follow combines Theorems 1 and 2. The bridge between
these results is a saddle point characterization of risk averse stochastic programming that
we give now.
Lemma 4. Let X be a nonempty polyhedral convex set in Rn; Ξ ∶ X → Z be such that each
component function Ξω is be convex and continuous on X; and r ∶ Z → R be a CRM whose
risk set D ⊂ P is either polyhedral convex or has nonempty interior relative to P. Then x∗
solves minx∈X r(Ξ(x)) if and only if there exists Π∗ ∈ P such that x∗ solves minx∈X EΠ∗[Ξ(x)]
and Π∗ solves maxΠ∈D EΠ[Ξ(x∗)].
Proof: We repeat the discussion at the start of [43, Section 3.2]. Extend each Ξω to take
the value ∞ for x /∈ X. Likewise define the composite functions r ○ Ξ to be r(Ξ(x)) when
x ∈X and ∞ otherwise. Then the subdifferential of r ○Ξ at x ∈X is the set of points EΠ[ξ]
where Π ∈ ∂r(Ξ(x)) and ξ is an uncertain outcome defined by ξω ∈ ∂Ξω(x) for each ω.
Two notes are that, first, because r is the support function of a nonempty closed convex
set D, then for any Z ∈ Z its subdifferential ∂r(Z) is the set arg maxΠ∈D EΠ[Z]; and, second,
the chain rule above applies when r = EΠ for any probability measure Π. Thus for x ∈ X,
∂(r ○Ξ)(x) is the union of subdifferentials ∂(EΠ ○Ξ)(x) over Π ∈ arg maxΠ∈D EΠ[Ξ(x)].
We have that x∗ solves minx∈X r(Ξ(x)) if and only if x∗ is a global minimizer of r ○ Ξ if
and only if 0 ∈ ∂(r ○Ξ)(x∗) if and only if there is some Π∗ ∈ arg maxΠ∈D EΠ[Ξ(x∗)] such that
0 ∈ ∂(EΠ∗○Ξ)(x∗). The last inclusion is equivalent to x∗ solving minx∈X EΠ∗[Ξ(x)].
Proof of Theorem 3: Part 1. The structure of the proof is to show equivalence of each
of the following statements using results listed previously:
1. (x1, x2) with some (Y,Q,P,W1,W2, P r) is a risky competitive capacity equilibrium
with complete markets.
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2. (x1, x2) with some (P,W1,W2, P r) is an equilibrium of the following: For i = 1,2,(xi,Wi) solves
min
xi,Wi
Ii(xi) + P r[Wi] + ri(V1ω(xi, Pω) −W1ω)
subject to xi ∈Xi, (9) for all ω,Wi ∈W;
Pω clears the spot market in each scenario ω; and P r clears the risk market (17).
3. (x1, x2) with some (P,P r) is an equilibrium of the following: For i = 1,2, xi solves
min
xi
EP r[V1ω(xi, Pω)] subject to xi ∈Xi;
Pω clears the spot market in each scenario ω; and P r solves
max
Π
EΠ[V1ω(x1, Pω) + V2ω(x1, Pω)]. (67)
4. (x1, x2) with some P r is an equilibrium of the risky Nash game: (x1, x2) solves
min
x1,x2
EP r[V0ω(x1, x2)] subject to x1 ∈X1, x2 ∈X2; (68)




5. (x1, x2) solves the risk averse system capacity problem (29).
6. (x1, x2) with some (Y,Q) solves the risk averse system capacity problem (28).
1 ⇔ 2 is trivial and immediate, cf., (11) and (12).
2 ⇔ 3 is seen by fixing P and applying Theorem 1 with Ξi ∶Xi → Z is defined by
Ξiω(xi) ∶= Ii(xi) + Viω(xi, Pω), for all ω.
(The conditions required of Ξi are given by Proposition 1.)
3⇔ 4: In statement 3, the conditions on x1, x2 and P comprise a risk neutral competitive
capacity equilibrium model with probability measure Π = P r. Given that P r ∈ D0 ≻ 0,
Corollary 1 says that this equilibrium model is equivalent to (x1, x2) solving (68). The
equivalence between (67) and (69) uses the fact that V0ω(x1, x2) = V1ω(x1, Pω)+V2ω(x2, Pω),
for all ω, from Proposition 1.
4 ⇔ 5 is an application of the saddlepoint equivalence in Lemma 4.
5 ⇔ 6: This is elementary. First take a solution (xˆ1, xˆ2) of (29). This induces opti-
mal quantities Yˆω, Qˆω for (14) so that V0ω(xˆ1, xˆ2) = Cω(Yˆω) − Uω(Qˆω) for each ω. Since
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(xˆ1, xˆ2, Yˆ , Qˆ) is feasible for (28), the optimal value of (29) is bounded below by that of (28).
Conversely, for any feasible solution (x1, x2, Y,Q) of (28), Cω(Yω) − Uω(Qω) ≥ V0ω(x1, x2),
hence
r0(Cω(Yω) −Uω(Qω)) ≥ r0(V0ω(x1, x2))
because r0 is a CRM. This means that the optimal value of (28) is bounded below by that
of (29).
Part 2 is derived from the above proof of part 1 via Theorem 1, part 2.
The proof of Corollary 2 is the equivalence between statements 1 and 5 in the above
proof.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 8, part 2
Proof of Theorem 8, part 2: Take a spot market scenario ω. The Competitive Cost
Growth Assumption ensures that the optimization problems in the incomplete risk neutral
case (65) are coercive,16 hence solvable with solution sets bounded in the ∞-norm; indeed
for some c > 0, its solution sets lie in the ∞-ball of radius c about the origin irrespective of
the choice of probability measures Π1, Π2.
Note also that for any (x1, x2), using concavity of the utility function, the spot market
equilibrium (Yω,Qω, Pω) is such that 0 ≤ Pω = U ′ω(Qω) ≤ U ′ω(0; 1) when Uω is differentiable at
Qω; and, more generally, Pω lies in the superdifferential of Uω at Qω with 0 ≤ Pω ≤ U ′ω(0; 1).
Define CP as the Cartesian product over ω ∈ Ω of the intervals [0, U ′ω(0; 1)], so that CP will
contain the stochastic equilibrium price associated with any capacities.
We define three set mappings, one for each type of interaction. First, for the producer
and retailer, i = 1,2, let Φi(P,Πi) be the set of optimal solutions (x1, Y ) or (x2,Q) to the
optimization problems in (65). Those problems are continuous and convex with solution sets
bounded by c in the ∞ norm, namely, Φi maps CP ×P to subsets of Si where
S1 ∶= {(x1, Y ) ∶ x1 ∈X1, each Yω is feasible for (9), and ∥(x1, Y )∥∞ ≤ c} ,
S2 ∶= {(x1,Q) ∶ x2 ∈X2, each Qω is feasible for (10), and ∥(x2,Q)∥∞ ≤ c} .
In particular, Φi has nonempty convex compact values and also a closed graph. Second, let
ΦP map (x1, Y, x2,Q) to the corresponding set of stochastic equilibrium spot market prices
P = (Pω), i.e., ΦP ∶ S1×S2 → CP . This mapping has nonempty set values, which are obviously
bounded, from part 3(c) of Competitive Spot Market Assumptions in section 3.1. Indeed
ΦP (x1, x2) is closed and convex because it is the set of KKT multipliers (Proposition 1) of
16E.g., the objective function of the producer’s problem goes to infinity for feasible (x1, Y ) in each of the
three cases: ∥x1∥∞ →∞ and ∥Y ∥∞ is bounded; ∥x1∥∞ →∞ and ∥Y ∥∞ →∞; and ∥Y ∥∞ →∞ which implies
the previous case.
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a nonlinear program where all functions are convex and continuous on their domains; for
the same reason, ΦP has a closed graph. The final mapping, Φr ∶ S1 × S2 × CP → P × P,
sends (x1, Y, x2,Q,P ) to the set of all marginal risk equilibria (Π1,Π2) corresponding to(Z1, Z2) = (V1(x1, P ), V2(x2, P )). Using Lemma 3 we see that this set mapping has nonempty
convex compact values and is also closed since Vi(xi, P ) is continuous on Xi × CP .
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem now gives us (x∗1, x∗2, P ∗,Π∗1,Π∗2) such that x∗i ∈ Φi(P ∗,Π∗i )
for i = 1,2, P ∗ ∈ ΦP (x∗1, x∗2), and (Π∗1,Π∗2) ∈ Φr(x∗1, x∗2, P ∗). This is a solution of the marginal
risky competitive capacity equilibrium problem, and gives existence of a risky competitive
capacity equilibrium in incomplete markets by part 1.
8.3 Multistage proofs
Proof of Theorem 5: The multistage risky design equilibrium problem and multistage
risky Nash game can each be written as single stage problems by translating the multistage
space Z = RK to the (single stage) uncertain outcome space Z(L) = RL, hence multistage
risky costs Ξi(xi, x−i) to (single stage) risky costs Ξi(xi, x−i)L; and, via Lemma 2, composite
CRMs ri = σDi on Z to (single stage) CRMs rLi = σDLi on Z(L). Adapting (4), given a price
of risk Pˆ r on Z(L), agent i’s design problem becomes
min
xi,Wˆi
Pˆ r[Wˆi] + rLi (Ξi(xi, x−i)L − Wˆi) subject to xi ∈Xi, Wˆ ∈ Z(L).
As usual, at equilibrium Pˆ r must ensure that ∑i Wˆi = 0.
The Design Convexity and Design Technical assumptions of Section 2.2 hold trivially for
this reformulation, e.g., directional differentiability of Ξi(⋅, x−i)Lω holds for ω ∈ L because each
of its summands Ξi(⋅, x−i)ω′ , ω′ ∈ [ω], is directionally differentiable. The CRM assumptions,
on σDLi , hold by Lemma 2. Thus Theorem 1 applies to the single stage versions of the risky
equilibrium problem and risky game.
Translating single stage results back to the multistage case requires no additional work.
For instance, Theorem 1 ensures that the equilibrium Pˆ r lies in DL0 , i.e., has the single stage
form ΠL for some multistage probability measure Π ∈ D0, thus Π is multistage price of risk
for the multistage risky design equilibrium problem.
Proof of Theorem 6: Consider the multistage risky competitive capacity equilibrium
problem with complete markets. To apply Theorem 3 it is convenient to write the equilibrium
problem with ξi as a decision or control variable and xi implicitly defined as a state variable,
rather than the other way around. To that end we impose nonanticipativity on ξi,
for all ω′ ∈ Lc, ξiω is the same for all ω ∈ S(ω′). (70)
66
Note that such ξi generates a stagewise investment xi = (xiω′)ω′∈Lc via
xiω′ ∶= ξiω − ξiω′ for each ω′ ∈ Lc and any ω ∈ S(ω′).
Let xˆ(ξi) denote this mapping ξi ↦ xi which allows us to define
Iˆi(ξi) ∶= Ii(xˆ(ξi)),
Xˆi ∶= {ξi = (ξiω)Ω○ ∶ (70) holds and xˆ(ξi) ∈Xi}.
Conversely ξi can be recovered from xi = xˆ(ξi) via (57)–(58). That is, (xi, ξi) is feasible
with respect to ξi ∈ Xˆi and xi = xˆ(ξi) if and only if it is feasible with respect to xi ∈ Xi and
(57)–(58). This allows us to equivalently formulate (59) as
min
ξi,Wi
Iˆi(ξi) − P r[Wi] + ri(Vi(ξi, P ) −Wi) subject to ξi ∈ Xˆi. (71)
Following the template of the proof of Theorem 5, using Lemma 2, the multistage for-
mulation (71) can be reduced to an equivalent two stage formulation where the first stage is
deterministic investment, and the second stage deals with “single stage uncertainties” lying
in Z(L). Agent i, given a price of risk Pˆ r for financial products in Z(L) and a spot price
vector P , solves
min
ξi, Wˆi∈Z(L) Iˆi(ξi) − Pˆ r[Wˆi] + σDLi (Vi(ξi, P )L − Wˆi) subject to ξi ∈ Xˆi, (72)
where Vi(ξi, P )Lω ∶= ∑ω′∈[ω] Viω′(ξiω′ , Pω′) for each ω ∈ L, cf., (54).17 To explain further, for-
mally, in this constructed “single stage” setting, the spot price in a leaf scenario ω is a vector
P[ω] ∶= (Pω′)ω′∈[ω] and the corresponding conditions for an equilibrium price are separable,
i.e., equivalent to the usual competitive equilibrium price conditions in spot market ω′ (laid
out in Section 3.1.2) for each ω′ ∈ Ω. Thus there is no loss of generality in using P = (Pω)ω∈Ω
to represent equilibrium prices even though, formally, P[ω] is unrelated to the price at another
leaf node.
Thus the translation from multiple stages to two stages yields a two stage risky competi-
tive capacity equilibrium with complete markets. Part 1 of Theorem 3 says this is equivalent
to the (single stage) risk averse optimization problem
min
ξ1,ξ2
Iˆ1(ξ1) + Iˆ2(ξ2) + σDL0 (V0(ξ1, ξ2)L)
subject to ξ1 ∈ Xˆ1, ξ2 ∈ Xˆ2.
This problem is equivalent to (60) because σD0(Z) = σDL0 (ZL) from Lemma 2.
17E.g., in the simplest capacity setting, in scenario ω ∈ L, the generator is given the price (Pω′)[ω] and
capacity (ξ1ω′)[ω], and sets production 0 ≤ (yω′)[ω] ≤ (ξ1ω′)[ω] to yield its optimal cost V1(ξ1, P )Lω .
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